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Abstract
The government of Japan has purported to reinterpret the famous war-renouncing provision of
the Constitution in a controversial process that deliberately circumvented the formal amendment
procedure. This article argues that these developments should be of great interest to constitutional
law scholars in America because they bring into sharp focus issues that remain underdeveloped
and unresolved in the debate over informal amendment. Theories on informal amendment suggest
that there are some constitutional changes that exceed the reasonable range of normal interpretive
development, but which are not implemented through formal amendment procedures. The exis-
tence, scope, and legitimacy of such informal amendments remains hotly contested.
This article focuses on the key issue of legitimacy. It uses the Japanese reinterpretation as the con-
text in which to explore the relationship among three suggested factors affecting the legitimacy of
informal amendment, namely: the public ratification of the change; the intent of the agents of the
change; and the passage of time. It also suggests a new way of conceptualizing the relationship
among authority, legitimacy, and time in thinking about informal amendments, in that the level of
constitutional authority and degree of legitimacy that may be enjoyed by contested changes will
begin to diverge with the passage of time.
The article argues that deliberate attempts to effect significant constitutional change in a manner
calculated to circumvent the formal amendment process—such as the Abe government’s reinter-
pretation effort in Japan—are prima facie unauthorized and illegitimate at the time they occur.
Moreover, only the most explicit and deliberate expressions of popular sovereignty can serve to
legitimate such changes. But while such deliberate informal change will always remain unau-
thorized, it may be legitimated with the passage of time. I argue that this legitimation may, and
should, take longer than for less contested forms of change.
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ABSTRACT 
The government of Japan has purported to reinterpret the 
famous war-renouncing provision of the Constitution in a 
controversial process that deliberately circumvented the formal 
amendment procedure. This article argues that these developments 
should be of great interest to constitutional law scholars in America 
because they bring into sharp focus issues that remain 
underdeveloped and unresolved in the debate over informal 
amendment. Theories on informal amendment suggest that there are 
some constitutional changes that exceed the reasonable range of 
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normal interpretive development, but which are not implemented 
through formal amendment procedures. The existence, scope, and 
legitimacy of such informal amendments remains hotly contested. 
This article focuses on the key issue of legitimacy. It uses the 
Japanese reinterpretation as the context in which to explore the 
relationship among three suggested factors affecting the legitimacy of 
informal amendment, namely: the public ratification of the change; 
the intent of the agents of the change; and the passage of time. It also 
suggests a new way of conceptualizing the relationship among 
authority, legitimacy, and time in thinking about informal 
amendments, in that the level of constitutional authority and degree of 
legitimacy that may be enjoyed by contested changes will begin to 
diverge with the passage of time.  
The article argues that deliberate attempts to effect significant 
constitutional change in a manner calculated to circumvent the 
formal amendment process—such as the Abe government’s 
reinterpretation effort in Japan—are prima facie unauthorized and 
illegitimate at the time they occur. Moreover, only the most explicit 
and deliberate expressions of popular sovereignty can serve to 
legitimate such changes. But while such deliberate informal change 
will always remain unauthorized, it may be legitimated with the 
passage of time. I argue that this legitimation may, and should, take 
longer than for less contested forms of change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a vibrant debate in American constitutional law 
scholarship regarding the existence, nature, and legitimacy of so-
called informal amendments.1 The definition of the concept of 
“informal amendment” is itself an important subject in the debate, but 
we may start with the idea that the term refers to a form of significant 
change to the understanding and operation of a constitutional 
provision that is neither a formal amendment nor a normal 
                                                                                                             
1.  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 
Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) > 
26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change [hereinafter Levinson, 
How Many Times Has the United States Constitutions Been Amended?], in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 13 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION]; Akhil Reed Amar, Popular 
Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 89; Stephen 
Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION 37; Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 237 [hereinafter Lutz, Toward a Theory - Responding to 
Imperfection]; David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION 117; Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional 
Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 275; Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); 
ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (2009); Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 
(2014); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J. 408 
(2007); Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. 
L. REV. 155 (1997); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional 
Amendments: A Response to Strauss, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247 (2002); Rosalind Dixon, Updating 
Constitutional Rules, 8 SUP. CT. REV. 319 (2009); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of 
Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & 
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); 
Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L. J. 2576 (2014); Richard 
Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 
1062 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical 
Response to Our Democratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925 (2007). 
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interpretive development. Formal amendments are, of course, those 
changes to the constitution initiated and approved in accordance with 
the established constitutional amendment procedure. Interpretive 
developments are the incremental changes in meaning that are 
typically the result of judicial decision-making. Informal amendment 
refers to changes in meaning or understanding that are arguably so 
dramatic and relatively sudden that they are impossible to reconcile 
with the text, purpose, and historical operation of the provision in 
question (according to most accepted theories of constitutional 
interpretation), and therefore will not be accepted by most jurists as a 
“normal” interpretive move.2 Thus, the argument goes, such a change 
is better characterized as being a form of amendment to the 
constitutional system rather than an interpretive development, even 
though it is not a formal amendment and it creates no change to the 
underlying constitutional text.3 
This standard formulation of informal amendment obviously 
implicates much broader debates in constitutional law. These include, 
particularly, the competing theories of valid constitutional 
interpretation and related arguments over the question of whether, 
how, or to what extent the constitution can be said to legitimately 
change through interpretation by the judiciary or by other branches of 
government.4 There are thus differences among the theories of 
informal amendment which mirror differences among theories of 
constitutional interpretation. But the theories on informal amendment 
largely arise in response to the felt need to explain, and for some 
theorists to legitimate, the relatively dramatic changes to the 
American constitutional system that were not promulgated by way of 
a formal amendment in accordance with the Article V process, and 
which cannot be reconciled with most scholars’ notions of legitimate 
interpretive change.5 While the different theories of informal 
amendment share this common purpose, supporters of each differ in 
their explanations for the modalities and process of change. They 
differ both descriptively in terms of what changes qualify as an 
                                                                                                             
2.  Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended?, 
supra note 1, at 14-15. 
3.  Id. 
4.  See infra Section I.A. 
5.  Sanford Levinson, Imperfection and Amendability, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION, supra note 1, at 7. 
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informal amendment and how they are said to come about, and 
normatively in terms of whether or how such change might be 
considered beneficial or legitimate.6 And of course, there are critics 
who reject the very notion of informal amendments on both 
descriptive and normative grounds.7 
Even if we take these theories of informal amendment seriously 
and on their own terms, however, we are nonetheless left with 
profoundly difficult questions, some of which remain somewhat 
under-theorized and unresolved. These questions are both descriptive 
and normative in form, and while some of them may be impossible to 
resolve without first resolving the broader debates about 
interpretation,8 some of them may be less intractable. In particular, 
one question that seems insufficiently explored is whether such 
informal amendments are legitimate, and more importantly, how we 
are to determine if any given change is indeed legitimate. 
This article explores the question of the legitimacy of informal 
amendments. It does so by examining the recent efforts to 
“reinterpret” the famous war-renouncing provision of the Japanese 
constitution. This attempt to significantly change the meaning of the 
provision was undertaken by the Japanese cabinet in a very deliberate 
and calculated manner to circumvent the formal amendment 
procedure, and even to minimize legislative involvement and public 
participation in the process. The legitimacy of the attempted 
reinterpretation is the subject of considerable controversy within 
Japan, though the change may be in the process of becoming a fait 
accompli. In exploring this reinterpretation effort through the lens of 
informal amendment theory, the article identifies and analyzes three 
features of informal amendment as important factors for determining 
the legitimacy of any given change. In doing so, the article re-
conceptualizes the contours of informal constitutional change, 
exploring not only the relationship among these three factors of 
                                                                                                             
6.  See infra Section I.B. 
7.  See infra Section I.B. 
8.  The exact criteria for identifying informal amendments, for instance, will obviously 
depend in large measure upon what theory of constitutional interpretation one embraces, and 
so it would be difficult to answer questions about the exact border between interpretive change 
and informal amendment with any degree of certainty or precision, until debates over 
interpretation are settled. That is not likely to happen any time soon, and yet these remain 
important questions if we are to consider theories about informal amendment as useful in 
identifying different forms of constitutional change. 
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legitimacy, but also the distinction and relationship between the 
concepts of legitimacy and authority in the context of constitutional 
change. 
The first of the three factors that determine legitimacy, is the 
extent to which decision-makers within government are deliberately 
trying to bring about the specific change, in an intentional 
circumvention of the formal amendment procedure. The second is the 
extent to which there are explicit expressions of public will in favor of 
the change. And the third is the passage of time. With respect to the 
first factor, what I will call “deliberate agency,” the question is 
whether the claims to legitimacy of any particular informal 
amendment are (or ought to be) affected by the extent to which it is 
brought about by political actors who understand that the change 
constitutes an amendment, but nonetheless deliberately circumvent 
the formal amendment process in executing the change. This is in 
contrast to changes that might arise more organically through the 
complex dynamics of the law and policy making process among 
agencies and between the political branches of government, and are 
thus the product of the unintentional and unpredictable operations of a 
system.9 Put simply, does informal amendment theory accept as 
legitimate the deliberate circumventions of the formal amendment 
procedure? I will argue below that it should not. 
The second factor is that of popular will. To the extent that 
informal amendment theory has addressed the issue of legitimacy, the 
debate has tended to focus on the role of popular sovereignty and 
expressions of public will. Bruce Ackerman, one of the driving forces 
of informal amendment theory,10 as well as Akhil Amar,11 make 
explicit claims that informal amendments ratified or initiated by the 
people are legitimate precisely because they reflect an expression of 
popular sovereignty.12 These claims are contested.13 But I will explore 
them here within the context of the Japanese developments, and 
examine the relationship between popular sovereignty and the 
                                                                                                             
9.  On system effects in the constitutional context, see Adrian Vermeule, Forward: 
System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV L. REV. 4 (2009). 
10.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 1. 
11.  See Amar, supra note 1. 
12.  See infra notes 79-86 and 108, and accompanying text. 
13.  See, e.g., Dow, supra note 1. For details see infra notes 99-101 and accompanying 
text. 
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separate factors of deliberate agency and time as a basis for 
legitimacy. I will argue that while Ackerman’s theory cannot be 
applied to legitimate the Japanese experience, the reinterpretation in 
Japan reveals insights about the value of Ackerman’s theory that have 
been missed or under-appreciated in some of the critiques of his 
model. Specifically, while the critics may be correct that explicit 
expression of popular consent may not be a sufficient condition for 
the legitimation of deliberate informal amendment, they perhaps miss 
the point that such expressions of popular will ought to be a necessary 
condition.14 
The third factor is time. By the passage of time, I mean to focus 
on the fact that deeply contested constitutional changes, including 
informal amendments widely considered to be entirely unauthorized 
and illegitimate at the time they are undertaken, will gradually 
become legitimate over time, so long as the change can be sustained 
and entrenched.15 Thus, for instance, if some of the moves during the 
New Deal were illegitimate at the time (about which there is of course 
continued and vigorous debate), most of us will agree that with the 
passage of time they became legitimate in practical terms.16 This is 
due to the layers of law, policy, and precedent that are constructed 
upon the foundation of these changes. But there remains the question 
of whether such ex post recognition or acceptance could ever ground 
an argument for legitimizing ex ante the kinds of political or 
institutional developments that we are here calling informal 
amendment. In other words, can one look to examples such as the 
New Deal changes as precedents for purposes of legitimizing 
informal constitutional changes before or at the time they are 
effected? I will argue that such time-legitimated changes cannot serve 
as precedents for the ex-ante legitimation of informal amendments, 
particularly when such changes are the result of deliberate 
circumvention of the amendment process rather than the unconscious 
                                                                                                             
14.  See infra Section III.C. 
15.  Walter Murphy has turned his attention to the issue of time in the context of 
informal amendment, but does not focus on this particular aspect. See Walter F. Murphy, 
Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 1, at 163 
16.  Levinson points out that even Justice Bork implicitly conceded this point even as he 
argued against the validity of informal amendments. See Levinson, How Many Times Has the 
United States Constitution Been Amended?, supra note 1, at 35 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 215 (1990)). 
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product of dynamic systems. Be that as it may, however, the 
recognition of the effects of time should also serve to galvanize into 
action those who believe a change is illegitimate, for time will be of 
the essence.17 
What is more, in thinking about the relationship between time 
and legitimacy, we begin to understand that the passage of time is one 
factor that separates authority and legitimacy. That is to say, the 
legitimacy of any change is derived from and is almost synonymous 
with the constitutional authority for such change, at the time it is 
undertaken. But over time an unauthorized change may gain de facto 
legitimacy, while its lack of theoretical authority remains constant.18 
This leads to a possible reformulation of the relationship among 
authority, legitimacy, and time, which in turn leads to insights into the 
role that deliberate agency and popular will might play in determining 
legitimacy. I will suggest that the three factors—deliberate agency, 
popular will, and time—need to be understood separately as distinct 
criteria for legitimacy, but also collectively, in terms of how they 
relate to one another in the determination of legitimacy. And in 
particular, I will argue that this insight into the relationship between 
time and legitimacy grounds both a descriptive hypothesis and a 
normative argument that deliberate informal amendments such as that 
undertaken in Japan, in the absence of any ratification by explicit 
popular consent, will and ought to take longer to be legitimated than 
other forms of change.19 
The developments in Japan may be viewed as a case study of 
informal amendment that is unfolding in real-time. In order to 
properly use this case study, the article takes some time to explain the 
Japanese events in some detail.20 The salient points, however, are that 
the Japanese government under Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has been 
engaging in an effort to relax the constitutional constraints on the use 
of military force.21 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution famously 
renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and prohibits the 
                                                                                                             
17.  See infra Section III.C. 
18.  It has been pointed out that one could reverse this relationship, depending on how 
one conceives of legitimacy and authority—that is to say that a change may become 
authoritative in practical terms over time, while we might continue to insist that it lacked, and 
continues to lack, formal legitimacy. Thanks to my colleague Freddy Sourgens for this point. 
19.  See infra Section III.C. 
20.  See infra Part II. 
21.  See infra Section II.C. 
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threat or use of force.22 The government quite deliberately sought to 
implement what it acknowledged to be a significant change to the 
understanding of Article 9, in a manner that was calculated to 
circumvent the formal amendment procedure.23 The government 
implemented the reinterpretation through the issuance of a Cabinet 
Decision,24 based in part on the recommendations of an ad hoc extra-
constitutional body of so-called experts, and with little public input or 
legislative debate. It then committed the nation to the reinterpretation 
through international agreements with the United States. Only after all 
of this did the government submit legislation to the Diet (the 
legislature) that would revise national security laws in conformity 
with the reinterpretation—but even this did not require a debate on 
the substance of the reinterpretation itself. 
Meanwhile, the government interfered with the independence of 
government agencies that might oppose the reinterpretation, and tried 
to suppress media criticism of the moves.25 The entire effort gave rise 
to ferocious debate and protest within Japan, with tens of thousands of 
people protesting in the streets of Tokyo and other major cities. The 
majority of scholarly and professional opinion held the 
reinterpretation, and the subsequently revised national security laws, 
to be illegitimate and unconstitutional.26 Yet, despite all of this, the 
governing party was nonetheless hugely successful in elections for the 
Upper Chamber of the Diet in July of 2016. The inevitable 
constitutional challenges to the national security legislation have not 
yet resulted in any judicial decisions—but they will surely reach the 
Supreme Court in due course. It is unclear how the Court, which has 
been traditionally timid and deferential on constitutional issues, will 
deal with the challenges. The government’s effort is thus still very 
much a work in process and the jury is still out on whether the 
                                                                                                             
22.  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan). For the full 
text of the provision, see infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
23.  See infra Section II.C. 
24.  CABINET DECISION ON DEVELOPMENT OF SEAMLESS SECURITY LEGISLATION TO 
ENSURE JAPAN’S SURVIVAL AND PROTECT ITS PEOPLE (provisional English translation) (July 
1, 2014), available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf (last visited 
Aug., 2016) [hereinafter CABINET DECISION]. The original Japanese language version is 
available at: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei.pdf. 
25.  See infra Section II.C. 
26.  See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text. 
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reinterpretation will end up being entrenched, becoming a 
legitimatized change to the Constitution with the passage of time. 
These developments provide the constitutional law academy 
with a striking and potentially important example of deliberate efforts 
to engage in constitutional change in circumvention of the formal 
amendment procedure. When examined through the lens of informal 
amendment theory, the over-arching question presented by the 
Japanese reinterpretation effort is whether it can be classified, either 
now or in the future, as nothing more than a legitimate interpretive 
development, as an informal amendment, or as something else again. 
I argue below that the reinterpretation of Article 9 cannot be accepted 
as a normal and legitimate interpretive move—that it was arrived at 
through an invalid process, and is in any event substantively outside 
of the reasonable range of possible meanings of the provision when 
interpreted in accordance with most widely accepted theories of 
constitutional interpretation.  
Moving from this premise I examine the reinterpretation from 
the perspective of informal amendment theory. Specifically, I focus 
on the role of deliberate agency, popular will, and passage of time as 
determinants of legitimacy. The reinterpretation is one of the clearest 
examples of a government trying to implement significant 
constitutional change through methods that reflect a deliberate and 
self-conscious effort to circumvent the formal amendment procedure, 
and so brings the issue of deliberate agency into stark relief. Japan 
also provides us with an excellent example of the ambiguity and 
complexity involved in trying to attribute constitutional meaning to 
election results following putative informal amendments. It provides 
support for some of the theoretical criticism of popular sovereignty 
arguments for legitimacy, but also reveals some of the overlooked 
value in Ackerman’s theories about the relationship between popular 
sovereignty and the legitimacy of informal amendment.27 In sum, I 
conclude that the reinterpretation is not legitimate, and that it helps 
illustrates how and why deliberate agency and public will should be 
considered in assessing the legitimacy of informal amendments, and 
why time is of the essence in opposing them. 
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an 
examination of informal amendment theories, focusing on how they 
                                                                                                             
27.  See infra Section III.C. 
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treat the question of legitimacy, and in particular how or to what 
extent the different theories consider deliberate agency, popular will, 
and the passage of time as factors contributing to legitimacy. Part II 
provides an explanation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and 
the efforts of the Japanese government to reinterpret the provision. 
Part III examines first whether the reinterpretation can be 
characterized as a normal interpretive development, and then analyzes 
the reinterpretation as an informal amendment, assessing what it tells 
us about the factors of deliberate agency, popular will, and time as 
determinants of legitimacy. In addition to evaluating the legitimacy of 
the reinterpretation, it examines how we might re-conceptualize the 
contours of informal amendment and our understanding of the 
determinants of legitimacy. The article has two audiences in mind: the 
first being American constitutional law scholars, for whom it seeks to 
clarify certain aspects of informal amendment theory, and explain the 
significance of the Japanese example; and the second being Japanese 
constitutional law scholars, for whom it seeks to provide insights and 
warnings regarding what American informal amendment theory may 
say about the legitimacy of the reinterpretation of Article 9. 
I. INFORMAL AMENDMENT 
This Part explores some of the defining features of informal 
amendment theory, and in particular those differences among the 
various explanations of informal amendment that are most salient to 
the issues of deliberate agency, popular will, and time as factors of 
legitimacy. But before launching into that examination, it may be 
prudent to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and premises 
of this study. As mentioned earlier, because the debate over informal 
amendment implicates much broader and more fundamental 
disagreements in constitutional law, it is important to be quite clear, if 
necessarily brief, about some of the principles and theoretical 
positions that form part of the foundation for my analysis. 
A. Preliminaries - Assumptions and Premises 
First, a constitution, as the legal framework that defines the 
distribution of power and authority within the State, has the dual 
purpose of both facilitating and making the exercise of political power 
438 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
possible, and constraining government power in meaningful ways.28 
This idea that constitutions constrain the exercise of government 
power of course reflects the basic democratic rule of law principle 
that the law applies equally to all, including all branches and agencies 
of government, and is also a necessary condition for the concept of 
constitutionally protected individual rights.29 But the idea is also the 
foundation of the notion that constitutions, or at least some 
constitutional provisions, serve as pre-commitment devices—that is, 
mechanisms designed by the drafters to bind future generations of 
government to specified values, principles, and conduct, particularly 
in circumstances of crisis or passion in which future governments 
might be expected to depart from the original vision of the 
constitution.30 This all may seem rather obvious, yet it bears repeating 
here, because Prime Minister Shinzō Abe famously remarked in the 
context of the reinterpretation debate that the idea that constitutions 
are designed to limit state power was an anachronistic view.31 Finally, 
it should be noted that while binding on future generations of 
government, liberal democratic constitutions derive some of their 
legitimacy from the very fact that they can be changed—that they, in 
effect, delegate some of the drafting authority to future generations 
through the mechanism of an amending formula.32 At the same time, 
the amendment procedure is typically difficult, and must be more 
difficult than the mere passage of laws if the constitution is to fulfill 
its entrenchment function in any meaningful way.33 
                                                                                                             
28.  Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and Change in the United States: The 
Official and the Unofficial, 14 JUS POLITICUM 1, 2 (2015) (constitutions are “frameworks for 
making politics possible”). 
29.  We will return to this relationship between constraints and rights, but on this see, 
e.g., Dow, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
30.  On constitutions as pre-commitment devices generally, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES 
AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979); see also CASS 
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 96-101 (2001); Stephen 
Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). 
31.  Lawyer Group Charges Abe with Constitutional Ignorance, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 14, 
2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/14/national/lawyer-group-charges-abe-with-
constitutional-ignorance/ (“the idea that the Constitution is intended to limit the power of the 
state is an old-fashioned view held at the time when a monarch was governing the country with 
absolute power.”). 
32.  Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 275-76. 
33.  Dow, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
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The concept of “constitution” here is more than the mere text or 
documents comprising the written constitution. In the United States 
(and many other constitutional systems) the actual document looms 
large in our thinking about the Constitution, and there are times when 
a focus on the text is necessary;34 however, it is important to 
recognize that the Constitution in broader terms is best thought of as a 
system. That is to say, that in addition to any document that comprises 
the text of a constitution, there is a broader system of principles, 
jurisprudence, conventions, understandings, and quasi-constitutional 
statutes that together operate to form what may be called the 
“constitution-in-practice.”35 And like most systems, it is assumed here 
that most democratic constitutional systems are dynamic and 
constantly changing. To say that they are always changing is to 
recognize the widely accepted idea that there is legitimate incremental 
change in constitutional meaning through judicial interpretation 
(recognizing, of course, that this is not accepted by certain strands of 
originalist theory).36 This is so in part because many constitutional 
provisions are cast in general language, stipulating standards and 
principles rather than clear rules, and thus require judgment in 
interpretation, construction, and the development of doctrine and tests 
for their future application.37 
While there are differing theories of precisely how constitutional 
provisions ought to be interpreted, most accept that there is some 
reasonable range of possible meaning for any given provision, and the 
range of possible meaning under each of those theories overlap to a 
considerable degree.38 With the passage of time, shifting ideas, and 
                                                                                                             
34.  See, e.g., GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 (emphasizing that for their study “we 
do indeed mean the text, specifically the written constitutional charter of independent 
countries.”). 
35.  Balkin, supra note 28, at 3; Griffin, supra note 1, at 38, 44; see also DAVID A. 
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living 
Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1129 (2012). 
36.  For an overview of originalist theories, see, e.g., THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (GRANT HUSCROFT & 
BRADLEY W. MILLER EDS., 2011). Not all strands of originalist theory would disagree. See, 
e.g., Balkin, supra note 28, at 3-4, 21-23. 
37.  Balkin, supra note 28, at 2, 6-7. 
38.  Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended?, 
supra note 1, at 17-18; Lutz, Toward a Theory - Responding to Imperfection, supra note 1, at 
241. For a short overview of theories of constitutional interpretation, see JOHN H. GARVEY ET 
AL., MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 91-218 (5th ed. 2004); see also 
Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 
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evolving political and social conditions, the interpretation of those 
constitutional principles, standards, and constructed doctrines will 
evolve incrementally in the jurisprudence of the judiciary. Moreover, 
while the ultimate interpretive move is typically undertaken by the 
judiciary (at least in those constitutional systems in which there is a 
strong convention of constitutional judicial review), this process of 
constitutional change is often driven by the other branches of 
government, and indeed by political parties and civil society acting 
through and on the political branches of government. In most 
instances, however, the judiciary is called upon in the final stage to 
either ratify or reject the resulting political action, policy, or law.39 In 
many ways the starting point for any discussion of informal 
amendment is the idea that this form of interpretive development, 
occurring within what most would accept as the range of reasonable 
interpretation for any given provision, is valid and legitimate (with 
the noted exception of certain strands of originalism). 
It is widely accepted that constitutions legitimately change 
through this process of interpretive development, but there is far less 
agreement on where the outer limits are for the range of reasonable 
and legitimate meanings of specific provisions in particular 
circumstances. Similarly, there is less agreement over what it means 
when any particular interpretation is widely perceived to have 
exceeded the limits of legitimate interpretive moves. That some 
change does exceed this limit is of course the very basis for the theory 
of informal amendment. But it should be made clear that many 
scholars and jurists do not accept the idea that putative interpretive 
moves, or other forms of constitutional change that exceed the 
legitimate bounds of this valid process of interpretive development, 
can be properly characterized and normalized as so-called informal 
amendments.40 
Many reject the informal amendment claims on descriptive 
grounds, simply accepting as legitimate interpretation that which 
                                                                                                             
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (1987) (arguing that the differences among theories of 
constitutional interpretation are not as great as commonly thought). 
39.  Balkin, supra note 28, at 7-10. There are, of course, challenges to the idea that the 
judiciary has the primary role in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry Alexander Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
40.  See, e.g., Dow, supra note 1; Barnett, supra note 1. 
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informal amendment proponents claim to be extraordinary change 
requiring special explanation.41 But more importantly, perhaps, many 
also reject the claims on normative grounds, even as some of these 
critics concede that as a descriptive matter significant and 
unauthorized changes—changes that do exceed the reasonable limits 
of interpretation—apparently do occur from time to time. I will 
explore their ideas further below. For some in this camp, however, the 
idea of informal amendment is bitterly acknowledged as being real, 
but at the same time the source of a paradox that cripples the very 
idea of rule of law constitutionalism.42 For others it is a theory to be 
denied, denounced, and rejected precisely because its acceptance 
would constitute a threat to rule of law constitutionalism.43 
While I am sympathetic to several of the normative arguments of 
the critics of informal amendment theory, in this article I assume that 
the phenomenon it seeks to explain is real, and that moreover it is an 
important issue that requires explanation. Certainly in the American 
context (but not only in the American context) there are changes that 
are difficult to account for by reference to “normal” interpretive 
developments. Moreover, efforts to reconcile such changes with our 
accepted theories of constitutional interpretation can end up 
weakening the coherence and integrity of those theories, and 
undermining the normative power of the Constitution. Thus, the 
article takes the theory of informal amendment on its own terms, and 
tries to explore the different approaches, explanations, and some 
unresolved questions about the process, with a view to advancing our 
understanding of the theory. At the same time, it is worth noting that 
the informal amendment theories under discussion here, as different 
as they are in their detail, all share the idea that a constitution itself, as 
a body of law, provides the framework within which one must 
consider the idea of constitutional change. This is in contrast to some 
scholars who argue that one can validly and legitimately think about 
bringing about constitutional change through the radical change to the 
socio-political presuppositions from which a constitution initially 
developed, in total disregard of what the constitutional system itself 
                                                                                                             
41.  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 279, n.9. 
42.  See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 1. 
43.  See, e.g., Dow, supra note 1. 
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provides regarding amendment.44 I am not here engaging these more 
radical political theories of constitutional change. 
Finally, some preliminary words are perhaps necessary on the 
question of whether it is proper or feasible to apply this American 
theory of constitutional law to a Japanese situation; and, similarly, 
whether it is possible to draw any meaningful lessons for the 
American theory from a Japanese case study. It is of course widely 
accepted that the comparative analysis of constitutional law is both 
valid and fruitful, and there is a growing literature on the topic.45 With 
respect to theories of informal amendment more specifically, most 
writing in the American academy has been focused on the American 
constitutional experience. Indeed some aspects of American 
explanations relate to attributes that are unique to the American 
system and its history. But the phenomenon it explores is certainly not 
limited to the United States. Questions as to how far the range of 
reasonable and legitimate interpretive development extend, and what 
branches of government can be involved, are not unique. The 
principles involved are common to most liberal constitutional 
democracies.46 What is more, there are have been other comparative 
                                                                                                             
44.  Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 1, at 145. 
45.  See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2014); MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006); COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2013); Mark Tushnet, The 
Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). 
46.   There are analogous European theories of constitutional mutation that have much 
in common with informal amendment theory. In particular see the theories of informal 
constitutional change developed by Georg Jellinek, discussed in Carlos Bernal, Forward-
Informal Constitutional Change: A Critical Introduction and Appraisal, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 
493, 505 n.40 (2014). Similarly, in several of the Commonwealth countries there are forms of 
constitutional change that might fall within the range of what is here being called informal 
amendment, such as the creation of “constitutional conventions,” some of which are 
recognized as legitimate and for which criteria are clearly established. See SIR W. IVOR 
JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 136 (5th ed., 1959) (articulating the seminal test 
for the establishment of a convention). See Ryan Patrick Alford, War With ISIL: Should 
Parliament Decide? 20 REV. CONST. STUD. 118, 123-28 (2015) (reviewing the modern law on 
conventions, and describing the establishment of a new convention on parliamentary approval 
of the use of force in the United Kingdom, 2003-14). It might be argued that it is a misnomer 
to classify such a convention an informal amendment, since the United Kingdom does not 
have a written constitution, and so no formal constitutional amendment procedure, but the fact 
that the concept has been adopted in commonwealth countries that do have written 
constitutions, with formal amendment procedures, arguably makes the process relevant to 
informal amendment theory. But see Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Stealth, 60 
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studies that have examined putative examples of informal amendment 
in other countries through the lens of American informal amendment 
theory.47 Thus, on both questions of whether the theory is applicable 
in other contexts, and whether a Japanese case study can provide 
insights, I would argue that the theory is entirely susceptible to 
analysis from a comparative law perspective—and for reasons I will 
explain in more detail below, American scholars and jurists can 
indeed learn from the Japanese experience. Nor is it inappropriate or 
inapt to suggest that the theory is relevant to Japan in particular, 
notwithstanding that the country is governed by a civil law system 
owing much of its legal tradition to Germany. The reality is that 
Japanese scholars, lawyers, and jurists increasingly look to American 
legal theory, jurisprudence, and scholarship in their own legal 
discourse, even on constitutional law, and thus this form of 
comparative analysis is not at all unusual in the Japanese context.48 
B. Theories of Informal Amendment and the Issue of Legitimacy 
Considerable differences exist among theorists who argue that 
there has been constitutional change through some form of informal 
amendment in the United States. They differ in terms of their 
descriptive explanations of the modalities of the process, the scope of 
the phenomenon, and the means of identifying any given informal 
amendment. They also differ in terms of their normative claims 
regarding the legitimacy, putative benefits, or perceived dangers of 
informal amendments. Indeed, some of those who explain alternative 
means of constitutional change do not use the term “informal 
amendment” at all, and may not situate themselves directly within 
                                                                                                             
MCGILL L.J. 673, 678 (2015) (arguing that efforts to deliberately create such constitutional 
conventions are a form of informal amendment, but are illegitimate). 
47.  See, e.g., Carlos Bernal, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case 
Study of Columbia: An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of Constitutional 
Replacement Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339 (2013); Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher 
Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as 
Constitutional Failures, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 193 (2008). 
48.  See, e.g., Hidenori Tomatsu, Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview of Efforts to 
Introduce U.S. Theories, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 
251-77 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); see also NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW] (3d ed. 2002) (this seminal constitutional text imports, for instance, American levels of 
scrutiny for judicial review of equality claims); SHINEGORI MATSUI, NIHON KOKU KENPŌ 
[JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (2d ed. 2002) (Matsui, a former student of John Hart Ely, 
is the primary proponent of process theory in Japanese constitutional discourse). 
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that debate, though their theories certainly implicate any discussion of 
informal amendment.49 Still, it is fair to say that all of the scholars 
involved share the common purpose of trying to explain constitutional 
change in more realistic and functional terms. They are trying to 
address the fact that the US Constitution, as a system, has changed 
markedly over its history, quite separate and apart from the changes 
wrought by the few formal amendments, and in ways that are at times 
very difficult to reconcile with most notions of legitimate interpretive 
development.50 
As will become apparent in this Part, these explanations and the 
differences among them give rise to a number of unresolved 
questions. I want to suggest, however, that one of the most 
fundamental of these questions relates to the issue of legitimacy. At 
root, all of these theories and explanations are in some form or 
another groping for a means of determining whether any particular 
form of constitutional change is or is not legitimate. Indeed, these 
explanations are to some degree motivated by the perceived problem 
that traditional perspectives, which apparently accept all of these 
problematic constitutional changes as “normal” interpretive 
developments, are simply ignoring and papering over the questions of 
legitimacy raised by potentially unauthorized forms of constitutional 
change. But while this may be the subtext, the explanations do not all 
address legitimacy explicitly, and those that do, tend to do so in 
various ways and to differing degrees. 
Before comparing their theoretical explanations, however, it is 
worth pausing to further clarify what is meant here by the legitimacy 
of constitutional change. There is, of course, considerable literature 
on the distinction between legality, authority, legitimacy, and power, 
not only in legal discourse but in political science and political 
philosophy.51 I will argue in Part III that the passage of time operates 
to open up a distinction between the authority and legitimacy of 
informal amendments. But in the first instance, at the time that change 
occurs, I conceive of legitimacy as flowing from the formal 
                                                                                                             
49.  See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1. 
50.  See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 1, at 3-11. 
51.  See, e.g., Dan Priel, The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory, 57 MCGILL L.J. 1 
(2011) (comparing legitimacy to validity, content, and normativity, with particular reference to 
Dworkin). 
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constitutional authority—like Murphy, who uses legitimacy as 
referring “not to popular support but to grounding in the existing 
system’s fundamental normative principles.”52 In this sense, 
legitimacy and authority are closely aligned at the time of the 
constitutional change, at least to the extent that the source of authority 
is itself then accepted and acknowledged as valid and legitimate. In 
this understanding, the authority for constitutional change relates to 
the formal source of that authority in either constitutional text or other 
fundamental normative principle. But the concept of legitimacy of the 
change has an additional aspect that is related to the perception and 
acceptance of the authoritativeness and validity of the change by 
those subject to the constitution. There is thus a psychological 
component to legitimacy, derived in the first instance from 
perceptions of the principled nature, virtue or validity of the 
institutional decision-maker or agent of change. It has been noted that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has itself referred to 
legitimacy in this sense, as depending in part upon the perceptions of 
the people.53 But over time (as will be discussed below) legitimacy 
for a change initially viewed as insufficiently authorized, may 
develop from mere acceptance or acquiescence, due to the extent to 
which the change has become entrenched and insinuated into the 
broader legal system.54 
Returning to the discussion of how legitimacy is treated within 
informal amendment theory, Sandy Levinson is one theorist who does 
discuss the issue. He suggests that to accept a given constitutional 
interpretation as such, is to “accord it a certain dignity” as a legitimate 
understanding of the Constitution, while formal amendments are ipso 
facto legitimated by the authority of the formal amendment 
procedure. Thus, he suggests that to reject that a putative 
interpretation is the result of a good faith exercise in legitimate 
interpretation, or that it can be plausibly supported by accepted 
canons of constitutional interpretation, is to suggest that the effort is 
                                                                                                             
52.  Murphy, supra note 15, at 173. 
53.  Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 
DUKE L. J. 703, 709 (1994) (citing Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 2814-16 
(1992)). 
54.  Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 756 (1982) 
(citing HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945)). For further discussion, 
see infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
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to surreptitiously amend the Constitution under the pretext of 
interpretation.55 This is to acknowledge that informal amendments 
have a legitimacy problem, and even points to the fact that intent and 
good faith are factors in determining legitimacy. Yet he does not 
return to directly deal with the issue of how the legitimacy of any 
given informal amendment is to be determined. The critics, of course, 
squarely deny that informal amendments can ever be legitimate at 
all.56 
I would suggest that the question of legitimacy has not been 
sufficiently addressed in the discourse on informal amendment. Most 
of the proponents of informal amendment theory do not identify the 
factors that are essential to the legitimacy of constitutional change in 
general, and the criteria that might be applied to assess the legitimacy 
of specific changes, either at the time such change is unfolding or at 
some time after the fact.57 In the rest of this Section I will explore 
several of the prominent theoretical explanations of constitutional 
change, paying particular attention to how they address the question 
of legitimacy, and more specifically how, under any particular 
explanation, these factors may impact the legitimacy of any given 
process of constitutional change. 
It is helpful to be clear that these more realist and functional 
explanations of constitutional change are responding to a perceived 
traditional view. To varying degrees and in somewhat different ways, 
the proponents of informal amendment claim that there is a 
mythological and romantic conception of the US Constitution, in 
response to which they are offering what they suggest is a more 
realistic understanding.58 The traditional narrative, they argue, tends 
to exaggerate the importance of the constitutional text, the meaning of 
which is understood to be authoritatively interpreted and enforced by 
the courts. This traditional view downplays or discounts the extent to 
                                                                                                             
55.  Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended?, 
supra note 1, at 7, 17. 
56.  See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 1; Dow, supra note 1. 
57.  This is not to say, of course, that there has been no consideration of the question of 
legitimacy. As discussed below, Ackerman does make a specific normative argument for the 
legitimacy of certain forms of informal amendment; Brannon Denning proposes a theory for 
the legitimacy of “constitutional change”, while carefully arguing that such change should not 
be characterized as an amendment. See Brannon P. Denning, Means To Amend: Theories of 
Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155 (1997). 
58.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 162, 211-12. 
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which the Constitution is best understood as a system of principles, 
norms, conventions, and institutions. A system defined and governed, 
it is true, by the framework laid out in the constitutional document, 
but nonetheless far more complex in operation than can be discerned 
or even inferred from the mere text of the document. Moreover, under 
the mythological or romantic view, the Constitution is viewed as the 
highest law of the land that trumps all other law, due to the authority 
it enjoys as a result of the super-majoritarian process by which it was 
ratified and subsequently amended, consistent with the fundamental 
ideals of popular sovereignty.59 Finally, according to the critics, 
myths have developed to explain dramatic constitutional changes, 
such as those that accompanied the New Deal, such that they can be 
implausibly reconciled with this traditional narrative and its principles 
of interpretative development.60 The proponents of informal 
amendment are seeking to pull aside this formalistic account and 
provide not only a more realistic description, but also a more 
sophisticated functional explanation. And some of them are trying to 
provide a normative defense of these extra-textual non-formal 
amendments. 
While these realist theories share a purpose of trying to better 
explain constitutional change, the explanations tend to differ in their 
understanding of the mechanisms and modalities of the process of 
change. I should also emphasize that some of these explanations of 
constitutional change relate to legitimate interpretive development as 
well as to what we are here calling informal amendment—they 
advance a more realistic account for all constitutional change along a 
spectrum, and do not always focus on defining the dividing line 
between interpretive change and informal amendment. Levinson 
breaks down the forms of constitutional change along this conceptual 
spectrum in the following way: (i) regular interpretation, typically by 
the judiciary; (ii) interpretive change in government powers effected 
by permissible legislation, executive order, or other policy; (iii) 
amendment, which represents a genuine change that is “not immanent 
within the pre-existing materials or allowable simply by the use of 
powers granted (or tolerated) by the [C]onstitution”; (iv) revision, 
which is a more significant kind of amendment, that alters more 
                                                                                                             
59.  ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 34. 
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448 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
fundamental aspects of the Constitution, but is nonetheless congruent 
with the values of the Constitution, and effected through the formal 
amendment procedure for such revision; and (v) revolutionary 
change, being constitutional change of such a dimension that it is not 
consistent with the immanent constitutional order, and which is 
“legitimated, if at all, by some extra-constitutional set of events.”61 
The “amendment” in (iii) is, to the extent it is not done in accordance 
with the amending formula, what we are calling informal amendment. 
We need not concern ourselves here with the distinction between 
“amendment” and “revision,” but are interested in the difference 
between “amendment” and the two forms of “interpretive change” on 
the one hand, or “revolution” on the other. 
While differing in their emphasis, the most common 
explanations tend to focus on changes arising from some combination 
of the judgments of courts, the implementation of law and policy by 
the political branches and the bureaucracy, and activities of various 
actors within civil society. As Jack Balkin describes it, constitutional 
change generally comes through a recursive process in which courts 
develop and apply constitutional constructions, which are more than 
mere interpretations of the text but rather are doctrines and tests 
developed for use in the analysis and application of principles and 
standards articulated in the Constitution.62 But construction is also 
developed by political branches of government and applied in the 
form of new laws, policies, institutions, and practices, and then 
pressed upon the judiciary to accept and endorse in the course of 
constitutional litigation. What is more, the political branches 
frequently develop such constructions under pressure or influence 
from other actors in civil society. There is, therefore, a recursive 
dialectical process among all these actors that leads to new 
constitutional constructions.63 
Most of the results of this process of constitutional change would 
be characterized by many or even most jurists as being within the 
                                                                                                             
61.  Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended?, 
supra note 1, at 21. It should be noted that different scholars use the term or concept of 
“revision” somewhat differently, but here Levinson is drawing from certain State constitutions, 
such as that of California, that explicitly contemplate a revision as being a more fundamental 
and significant form of amendment. We can put this distinction to one side for the moment. 
62.  Balkin, supra note 28, at 6-7. 
63.  Id. at 8-10. 
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scope of legitimate interpretive development, and thus not within the 
realm of informal amendment. But the implication here is that there 
will be times when the dialectic process results in “state building 
constructions,” by which Balkin means new constructions that both 
constitute significant interpretive moves and result in the construction 
of new state capacities.64 Some of these state building constructions 
will exceed the range of reasonable meaning supported by most 
theories of constitutional interpretation, at which point we have what 
some would call informal amendment. 
Some (but by no means all) proponents of informal amendment 
have drawn examples from the New Deal as reflecting this kind of 
combined construction, with judicial ratification of government action 
in the form of judgments that exceeded the limits of normal 
interpretive development.65 This would include several of the 
innovative government programs, such as the National Labor 
Relations Act66 and the Social Security Act,67 advanced by the 
Roosevelt administration during the later stages of the New Deal. 
These were then validated in a string of decisions by the Supreme 
Court, which had begun to exhibit a clearly shifting understanding of 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution.68 The constitutional 
changes wrought during the later stages of the New Deal quite 
obviously reflect one of the primary practical examples of the 
difficulty in determining the border between legitimate interpretive 
development and informal amendment. Ackerman, Strauss, and 
Levinson are just some of the more prominent scholars to suggest that 
these changes exceeded the range of normal interpretive development, 
while Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, David Dow, and many 
others involved in the debate clearly disagree.69 
                                                                                                             
64.  Id. at 9. See also Heather Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform, supra 
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What is less clear in the debate, however, is how the proponents 
of informal amendment understand the legitimacy of these changes. 
Ackerman, as we will see below, makes very explicit claims 
regarding their legitimacy, but many of the others do not. If the 
decisions of the Supreme Court that ratified or acquiesced in these 
changes exceeded the range of reasonable interpretation, were they 
thus illegitimate at the time? Did the fact that Roosevelt and his 
Cabinet thought the programs were constitutional, and that the 
Supreme Court of the early 1930s had been wrong in its 
understanding of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, make a 
difference to how legitimate the changes were at the time? To put it 
another way, if there was evidence that Roosevelt thought that his 
programs were inconsistent with the Constitution but he set out to 
implement them anyway in order to force an informal change to 
constitutional understanding, rather than pursue a formal Article V 
amendment, would that (or should that) influence our assessment of 
their legitimacy? 
The proponents of informal amendment do not directly explore 
these questions in any sort of comprehensive way. Ackerman, one of 
the few who tackles legitimacy head on, focuses on the role of 
expressions of popular will as legitimating these changes, rather than 
on the intent of the agents of change.70 What is clear, however, is that 
none of the proponents of informal amendment argue that the changes 
are now illegitimate. In other words, with the passage of time the 
changes were entrenched and at some point accepted as legitimate 
within the constitutional system. 
Some observers, such as David Strauss (who goes so far as to 
argue that informal amendments are far more significant mechanisms 
of constitutional change than formal amendments),71 go further back 
in time to identify such cases as McCulloch v. Maryland72 as being 
illustrative of this process of combined government-judiciary 
constructions. In McCulloch the Supreme Court adopted a very broad 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause73 to validate the 
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Federal Government’s constitutional authority to establish the Second 
Bank of the United States.74 When Hamilton had earlier relied on 
similar arguments to justify the establishment of the First Bank, 
James Madison had responded that the Constitution would not likely 
have been ratified had the clause been so understood at the time. Yet 
some twenty five years later, as President Madison, he accepted that 
this understanding was by then entrenched and so must be accepted.75 
While Strauss does not make explicit what his views are on the 
legitimacy of the decision in McCulloch at the time it was made, the 
implication is certainly that the Court’s judgment was outside of the 
reasonable range of meanings supported by accepted theories of 
constitutional interpretation. That would suggest that Strauss 
considers it to have been illegitimate at the time. Yet he describes 
how it became accepted—and thereby arguably legitimate—with the 
passage of time; and in Madison’s eyes, the passage of a mere twenty 
five years was sufficient. 
While Strauss and others tend to emphasize the judicial role in 
this process, others such as Eskridge and Ferejohn tend to focus on 
the role of legislation, and of unelected officials within both the 
legislature and the executive, in driving change.76 Again, this 
approach is more of a shift in emphasis than an entirely different 
theory of change. It too is responding to the formalistic and traditional 
view of constitutional law, an account which critics such as Eskridge 
argue must be revised to acknowledge the role of “super-statutes” and 
“administrative constitutionalism” in expanding and developing the 
constitutional system.77 Without getting into the details of their 
explanations, they rely to a considerable extent on the deliberative 
process by which these super-statutes are enacted. It is for this reason 
that Eskridge and Ferejohn term the process “administrative 
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constitutionalism,” in contrast to a “judicial constitutionalism” that 
emphasizes the role of the judiciary in driving interpretive change.78 
This emphasis on the deliberative process and the extent to which the 
statutes reflect the popular will might be seen as grounding some 
claim to legitimacy. But suppose that the judicial decisions ratifying 
these super statutes provide interpretations of the implicated 
constitutional provisions that are outside the reasonable range of 
legitimate interpretation—Eskridge and Ferejohn do not actually 
focus directly on the issue of whether such changes may raise 
questions of legitimacy. 
The proponents of informal amendment who are clearest on the 
issue of legitimacy are perhaps Ackerman and Amar, both of whom 
ground their arguments in favor of informal amendment in notions of 
popular sovereignty (though in strikingly different ways). Ackerman, 
who is perhaps the most closely associated with theories of informal 
amendment, also delves more deeply into the process by which such 
amendments might unfold and the form they might take. In so doing 
he provides some criteria for how to assess constitutional changes that 
are candidates for classification as informal amendment.79 He begins 
with the notion that while most law is made by the government, there 
is also (in the American context at least) a “higher law” that is created 
by the people. From this he argues that informal amendment can be 
characterized as an example of this form of higher law, which may be 
made in violation of the formal amendment procedure, and yet still 
fall within the framework of the Constitution and be consistent with 
its underlying vision.80 This creation of higher law by the people 
occurs in “constitutional moments,” characterized by a response to 
some form of constitutional crisis. Three examples of such 
constitutional moments that lead to informal amendments, in 
Ackerman’s view, are the original drafting and ratification process (as 
a change to the Articles of Confederation), the Reconstruction 
Amendments, and the New Deal programs discussed above. From 
these examples he abstracts a five-stage model of the process by 
which this form of constitutional change occurs.81 
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The first stage is characterized by a constitutional impasse, in 
which there is increasing disagreement over not only specific 
substantive policy being pursued by one of the political branches, but 
also over the extent to which such policy is constitutionally 
permissible. In the New Deal this impasse was over the President’s 
efforts, through both executive orders and federal legislation, to 
establish a foundation for more progressive social welfare, labor, and 
financial regulatory regimes.82 The second stage is electoral success 
by the party pressing for change, which is seen as a public ratification 
of the contentious programs, and is the initial step in the people’s role 
in the process. The third stage involves the political branch that is 
pressing for change, taking steps to challenge and confront those 
institutions that are “dissenting” or standing in the way of progress 
and thereby causing the impasse. During the New Deal, the executive 
was the branch pressing for change, with support from Congress, 
while the dissenting institution was the Supreme Court, which viewed 
the innovations as inconsistent with an interpretation of the 
Constitution that was strongly infused with ideas of laissez-faire 
economic theory and States’ rights. The challenge to the Court came 
most explicitly with Roosevelt’s threat to “pack the Court,” but 
political pressure had been mounting even prior to that.83 
The fourth stage of Ackerman’s framework is what he calls the 
“switch in time,” which is characterized by the challenged institution 
essentially buckling under the pressure or threat and changing course 
in line with the wishes of the moving branch before any lasting harm 
can be caused to the challenged institution or the system as a whole. 
The switch in time during the New Deal era, of course, was in the 
form of the Supreme Court beginning to change direction with its 
repudiation of the Lochner line of cases and acceptance of 
Roosevelt’s new labor and social security legislation.84 The entire 
process of informal amendment, however, is not complete until, in the 
fifth stage, the people ratify the changes through a consolidating 
popular election, in which the branch that had been pressing for the 
changes is vindicated with electoral success.85 Assessing whether this 
stage of the model has been met, of course, requires significant 
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interpretation and attribution of meaning to electoral results, which is 
open to significant question and has been the subject of considerable 
criticism.86 
A great deal has been written about Ackerman’s model, and 
while it has been very influential, aspects of it have also been heavily 
criticized. For the moment, however, I want to focus on how it relates 
to the three elements I am examining here. First, Ackerman is clearly 
making a normative claim that such informal amendments are 
legitimate precisely because they are expressions of popular 
sovereignty. But because of the elaborate nature of the process, with 
the determination that a given constitutional change is a legitimate 
informal amendment being contingent upon it satisfying the key 
elements of the five-stage model, it too would seem to be entirely 
retrospective. It does not depend upon the passage of time to confer 
legitimacy, since that is derived from the expression of popular 
sovereignty, but the passage of some time appears to be nonetheless 
required before one can identify developments as a legitimate 
informal amendment according to this model. Balkin and Levinson 
have made this point, arguing that Ackerman’s theory “works best in 
hindsight” and that it “offers little help for someone in the midst of 
potential constitutional revolution who needs guidance.”87 Moreover, 
they note that Ackerman’s theory requires actors to intuitively 
recognize, understand, and embrace the criteria for constitutional 
change that his model stipulates in order for them to understand 
whether some of the pre-conditions for action have been satisfied—
“they must understand that a key moment of transition has occurred 
or that a form of unconventional adaptation has been confirmed 
through subsequent election.”88 
These last comments also get at the issue of intent in 
Ackerman’s theory. I think that Ackerman, in contrast to many of the 
other proponents discussed thus far, would not view it as a problem 
that some of the actors involved in the process of informal 
amendment were acting with a deliberate view to effecting change 
outside of the formal amendment process. They would be viewed as 
merely engaging in what he calls constitutional politics. I do not read 
                                                                                                             
86.  See, e.g., Dow, supra note 1, at 117. 
87.  Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1079-80. 
88.  Id. 
2017] REINTERPRETING JAPAN'S WAR POWERS 455 
Ackerman as suggesting that it would have deprived the informal 
amendment of legitimacy had Roosevelt been acting in a self-
conscious and deliberate fashion to circumvent the Article V 
amendment procedure in order to effect constitutional change. But 
this is precisely because for Ackerman the legitimacy is derived from 
the popular ratification after a period of contested deliberative 
democratic process, in not one but two stages of the process. And, as 
Balkin and Levinson suggest, whether the change has been so ratified 
can only be assessed after the fact, and thus the model is of little 
assistance to those acting in the moment, in the middle of the process. 
Balkin and Levinson have proposed an alternative theory of 
what they call “constitutional revolution.” While presented as an 
alternative to Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change, it builds on 
Balkin’s idea of the state-building construction through a dialectic 
process among the judiciary, the other branches of government, and 
civil society. What is different is that it suggests that the process can 
be skewed by a process of “partisan entrenchment” to create more 
radical or “revolutionary” change.89 Partisan entrenchment refers to a 
sustained ideological shift in the Federal judiciary during periods in 
which one political party is dominant for sufficient time to 
significantly alter the composition of the judiciary, and particularly 
the Supreme Court, by appointing judges who subscribe to a 
particular ideological position on constitutional issues. Because 
Supreme Court justices serve for almost two decades on average, their 
influence persists well after the period of domination by the political 
party that appointed them. Balkin and Levinson argue that when a 
party has been able to dominate long enough to appoint sufficient 
numbers of judges and justices to create an imbalance within the 
Federal judiciary, an imbalance that tends to then be entrenched for a 
period lasting well beyond the party’s ascendency, the judiciary will 
tend to represent and express their nominating party’s understanding 
of the Constitution and public policy. The cumulative and aggregate 
effect of their constitutional decisions begin to change the 
interpretation and construction of the Constitution along the lines 
consistent with their party’s understanding of the Constitution.90 And 
this can give rise to constitutional revolutions, which are significant, 
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sustained departures from established understandings of the 
Constitution and its fundamental constitutive principles, and at times 
outside the range of the reasonable possible meanings of specific 
provisions.91 
Balkin and Levinson do not explicitly suggest that they view 
such “revolutions” as being per se illegitimate, or indicate whether 
some may be legitimate while others are not. But the implication is 
that they view some revolutions as having been legitimate, at least 
with the passage of time. For instance, they explain the judicial 
appointments by Roosevelt and the subsequent ratification of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal programs by the reformed Supreme Court as 
being an example of constitutional revolution resulting from partisan 
retrenchment.92 Yet they do not seem to suggest that this was in any 
way an illegitimate constitutional change. Indeed, Balkin has 
elsewhere viewed the New Deal as being within the ambit of natural 
and legitimate constitutional change.93 On the other hand, they also 
argue that the changes wrought with respect to States’ rights, racial 
equality, and civil rights by the Rehnquist Court in the fifteen years 
leading up to Bush v. Gore constitute a constitutional revolution 
resulting from partisan entrenchment.94 While they do not explicitly 
state that this revolution constitutes illegitimate change, they are 
clearly far more critical of the substance of these changes under the 
Rehnquist Court than they are of the New Deal changes, or changes 
wrought by the Warren Court. 
Intent or deliberate agency would not seem to be a factor in 
determining legitimacy under this theory, but this is largely due to the 
nature of the process itself. There is of course a deliberate and self-
conscious aspect to the decisions of politicians to appoint judges that 
share a particular understanding of the Constitution. Increasingly, in 
the last couple of decades, this can be seen as part of a deliberate 
strategy to effect precisely the kind of partisan entrenchment that 
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Balkin and Levinson identify. But as they argue, the process of 
change that results from this appointment of like-minded judges is 
incremental and unpredictable—the result of a complex mix of 
factors—and contingent on such variables as the mix of cases that 
come before the courts.95 The government actors cannot be said to 
have acted with deliberation and calculation in trying to bring about 
any specific change, but rather only to move the ideological center of 
constitutional understanding in a particular direction. Thus, it would 
seem to follow that intent or deliberate agency in trying to circumvent 
the formal amendment procedure are not going to be elements in 
determining the legitimacy of any particular change under this theory 
of constitutional change. 
It may be that the key to understanding their position on the 
legitimacy of this more radical form of constitutional change is to be 
found in their arguments on how best to respond to constitutional 
revolution. They argue that it is somewhat meaningless, at least ex 
post, to criticize constitutional revolutions on the grounds that the 
changes wrought failed to comply with the constitutional principles 
that govern and define legitimate constitutional change. That is, to 
argue that the changes failed to comply with amendment procedure, 
or that they are outside of the range of reasonable interpretation. 
Meaningless not because such arguments are wrong, but because they 
will have little or no purchase—they are not, for instance, going to 
convince Supreme Court justices to alter their views or their 
subsequent judgment. Rather, Balkin and Levinson argue, 
constitutional revolutions must be criticized on the basis of the 
substantive public policy principles that the revolution seeks to 
advance, its conception of “we the people,” and “the constitutional 
principles that [the revolution] espouses and the vision of the country 
that it summons.”96 In short, they argue that one must criticize such 
changes not in terms of constitutional law, but in terms of what they 
call “high-politics,” with a view to winning the political battle over 
control of the appointments process.97 
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This would seem to suggest that at least when assessing the 
legitimacy of the kind of change that takes the form of constitutional 
revolution through partisan entrenchment, the determination is likely 
to be deeply divided and contested along partisan or ideological lines, 
based on each observer’s ideological and normative understanding of 
the Constitution’s vision. Legitimacy will be based on one’s 
agreement or disagreement with the substance of the change, and not 
by reference to legal arguments over the range of reasonable 
meanings that can be supported by the text, purpose, history and 
operation of a constitutional provision, in accordance with accepted 
theories of interpretation. In short, the passage of time will likely 
confer legitimacy on any revolutionary change so long as it can be 
sustained over time, regardless how contested it is at the time of its 
development, and this means it will be more difficult to overturn such 
changes absent a countervailing revolution. 
As I will take up in more detail below, this conclusion means 
that time is of the essence in disputing such changes at the time that 
they get underway. Balkin and Levinson, writing in the aftermath of 
Bush v. Gore and bewailing the conservative constitutional revolution 
flowing from the Republican Party’s partisan entrenchment of 
appointees in the judiciary leading up to that most political of cases, 
suggest that if President Bush were to win the upcoming 2004 
election, it would tend to further entrench and perhaps even legitimate 
the changes wrought in the revolution.98 Thus, while certainly not the 
kind of normative arguments for legitimating constitutional change 
through popular sovereignty advanced by Ackerman and Amar, in 
practical and descriptive terms we are back to the idea that 
legitimation may come through some form of ratification by the 
expression of popular will, if only because success in the election will 
lead to an extension of the entrenchment period and thus legitimation 
through the passage of time. 
C. Critics and the Contours of Legitimacy 
These claims of informal amendment have been the subject of 
considerable criticism. These criticisms relate to both the descriptive 
and normative aspects of the claims. As a descriptive matter, critics 
question what the criteria are for determining whether any given 
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constitutional change constitutes an informal amendment. And from a 
normative perspective, if such change can ever be legitimate in 
principle, what exactly are the criteria for determining whether any 
such specific change is legitimate? 
Going beyond such questions, many of the critics advance 
affirmative normative arguments against the theories of informal 
amendment. David Dow is one of the harshest critics along these 
lines. He, like Griffin, seems to concede that informal amendments 
may occur as a descriptive matter, but he argues that proponents such 
as Ackerman and Amar fatally confuse an ability and power to effect 
informal amendment with the authority and legitimacy to do so. That 
such change may happen does not make it right or suggest that there 
was any legal authority for it, or that any legitimacy can or should be 
conferred upon it after the fact. Thus, in his view, the claims of 
Ackerman and Amar that such informal amendment could ever be 
legitimate is flawed.99 
The theoretical foundation for Dow’s argument is not mere 
formalism and a dogmatic adherence to the text of the Constitution. 
Rather, he argues that to accept the idea that the Constitution can be 
amended by majority whim, apart from the formal amendment 
process, would be to hopelessly undermine the notion of strong 
individual rights.100 Moreover, he points out that the projects of both 
Ackerman and Amar are in part trying to wrestle with the counter-
majoritarian problem posed by the difficulty of amendment. But they 
make the crucial error of conflating popular sovereignty with 
majoritarianism in the process. It is due to this conflation that they 
mistakenly argue that change wrought by a popular majority 
somehow constitutes an expression of popular sovereignty. Yet, the 
formulation and ratification of a difficult amendment process, one that 
requires a supermajority, was itself an exercise of popular 
sovereignty.101 
Cass Sunstein and Stephen Holmes similarly note that while the 
difficulty of formal amendment does pose a counter-majoritarian 
problem, it is not inconsistent with democratic principles. While a 
liberal democratic constitution derives much of its legitimacy from 
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the idea that it can be amended in the future, with the amendment 
procedure comprising a delegation of drafting authority to future 
generations, the process must be sufficiently difficult in order to 
safeguard the individual rights that are also a fundamental component 
of liberal conceptions of democracy.102 Those in this camp more 
generally argue that a theory that accepts as legitimate the idea that a 
constitution can undergo change in some way that exceeds the normal 
interpretive development, but in the absence of formal amendment, is 
to normalize and validate an idea that negates the very purpose of 
mandating a difficult amendment procedure. This in turn undermines 
the constraining nature of constitutions as the highest law of the land, 
erodes the strength of constitutional provisions as pre-commitment 
devices, and guts the commitment to strong constitutional rights for 
individuals, and particularly for minorities.103 
Stepping back from this survey of both proponents and critics of 
informal amendment, it remains difficult to distill the exact contours 
of the normative claims, particularly on the issue of legitimacy. At 
one end of the spectrum is Griffin, who acknowledges the existence 
of informal amendments while at the same time condemning them 
from a normative perspective, arguing that they constitute an 
illegitimate phenomenon that arises from a paradox inherent in liberal 
constitutionalism.104 Somewhere in the middle are proponents such as 
Levinson, who not only acknowledge the existence of informal 
amendments as a descriptive matter, but also seem to concede that 
such changes must be accepted as being legitimate after the fact, even 
if they may not have been so at the time they were made. Balkin 
views some such change resulting from a dialectic among branches of 
government as clearly legitimate, though it is a little less clear what 
his position is on the legitimacy of constitutional revolutions arising 
from partisan entrenchment. He is clear that such changes should be 
attacked (or defended) on the ideological level by engaging in what 
he calls high politics, but that is not to say that the process of change 
is itself illegitimate. At the other end of the spectrum are Ackerman 
and Amar, who clearly suggest that informal amendment as they each 
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define it is legitimate, but even here there is some uncertainty 
regarding the contours. It is clear that Ackerman accepts the 
legitimacy of such informal amendments ex post, once ratified by “we 
the people” in an election—but it is less clear whether he accepts that 
it would be legitimate for actors in either of the political branches to 
self-consciously set out to deliberately circumvent the Article V 
amendment process by seeking to follow the five-step process he 
outlines. 
Indeed, Balkin and Levinson, in their work on partisan 
entrenchment, reject Ackerman’s theory in part for reasons that flow 
from this normative uncertainty. They suggest that it offers very little 
assistance or guidance to political actors in the midst of a potential 
constitutional change, and rather “works best in hindsight.”105 Nor, 
they argue, does Ackerman’s theory help in the moment for 
determining whether a “judicial adventure” such as Bush v. Gore 
should be condemned as illegitimate, or acknowledged as an early 
stage of a “constitutional moment.”106 By the same token, however, 
Balkin and Levinson’s theory of constitutional revolution through 
partisan entrenchment contemplates a cumulative and unpredictable 
process, which may involve self-conscious efforts in terms of the 
appointment of ideologically committed judges, but the legitimacy of 
any resulting constitutional revolution would seem to depend on 
whether the revolution can be sustained through victory in the intense 
high-politics debate that follows.107 Amar would appear to come 
closest to arguing that there may be some ex ante justification for 
claims of informal amendment, but he places the legitimacy for such 
claims squarely with “we the people” and the direct exercise of 
popular sovereignty. He explicitly states that the Article V 
amendment procedure is the only legitimate avenue for government 
itself to amend the Constitution.108 Amar’s approach would thus seem 
to rule out any self-conscious effort by political actors within 
government to initiate such an informal amendment. 
The forgoing discussion has not yet answered with any 
specificity where the borders between authorized change and informal 
amendment may lie, what the criteria may be, or how and when 
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legitimacy may be enjoyed by such informal amendments. Rather, it 
attempts to clarify the landscape of constitutional change and helps 
bring into focus the scope and importance of these questions. I will 
return to again engage the questions later in the article with a view to 
getting closer to the answers, particularly on the issue of legitimacy. 
Thinking about whether Japan’s reinterpretation effort constitutes an 
informal amendment, and on what basis we would know that, and 
whether it is now or under which conditions it could be considered 
legitimate, should help illuminate and sharpen our understanding of 
the contours of the model and perhaps even suggest ways in which we 
need to alter our thinking about informal amendment. 
II. THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL REINTERPRETATION 
In this Part of the article I will explain the process and substance 
of the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. In 
order to understand that within the broader context of Japanese 
constitutional law, however, a brief preliminary explanation of Article 
9 and the Constitution itself is necessary. 
A. The Constitution of Japan and Article 9 
The story of the origins of the Constitution of Japan is 
extraordinary, full of drama, intrigue, and sources of inspiration.109 
The current Constitution was drafted in 1946, though it was 
technically promulgated as a revision of the original Meiji 
Constitution of 1889, which had been modeled on the Prussian 
Constitution.110 The failure of the Meiji Constitution was viewed by 
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the allied powers as one of the causes of World War II, and the 
United States demanded that the post-surrender Japanese government 
substantially revise or replace the Meiji Constitution.111 When the 
Japanese government made little headway on the project by early 
1946, MacArthur’s staff in General Head Quarters (“GHQ”) took 
over the task, shortly before the United States was to lose jurisdiction 
over the issue to the Far Eastern Commission.112 MacArthur directed 
that a team of young American staff members develop an entirely 
new draft constitution based on four major points, two of which were 
that sovereignty was to reside in the people (as opposed to the 
Emperor, as it was in the Meiji Constitution), and that war and the 
maintenance of armed forces were to be renounced.113 The small 
group of young military and civilian members of General Whitney’s 
staff in Tokyo worked around the clock for six days (unbeknownst to 
the Japanese government, the US government, or even much of the 
senior staff in GHQ) to produce the first draft of what is now the 
Constitution of Japan.114 It was then presented to the Cabinet of Prime 
Minister Shidehara as a fait accompli, with considerable pressure to 
accept the draft as the working basis of a new constitution to replace 
the Meiji Constitution.115 After initial resistance the Japanese 
government did accept the American draft, though it managed to 
negotiate some changes to it in the following weeks. The draft was 
then translated and made public, and then went through a year of 
                                                                                                             
BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE OLIGARCHS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN 1868-1891 (1957). 
111.  Potsdam Declaration Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, U.S.-P.R.C.-U.K., 
July 26, 1945, reprinted in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents: 1941-49, 
at 49-50 (S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
1950), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (last accessed Dec. 2016); 
and see MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 28-29. 
112.   MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 74-75, 89-90. 
113.  The other two were that the feudal system and the nobility were to be abolished 
and a British style budge system was to be adopted. See THREE BASIC POINTS STATED BY 
SUPREME COMMANDER TO BE “MUSTS” IN CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, NATIONAL DIET 
LIBRARY, available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/072/072_002l.html (last 
visited Dec. 2016) (containing the photographic image of the original memo). The original 
handwritten note, thought to have been written by Gen. Whitney as dictated to by Gen. 
MacArthur, has been lost. See MCNELLY, supra note 109, at 115–116. 
114.  SHŌICHI, supra note 109, at 74-76. 
115.  Robinson and Moore argue that MacArthur essentially threatened to put the draft 
to the people for consideration, and also suggested that only if the government accepted this 
draft could MacArthur’s staff stave off a possible prosecution of the Emperor for war crimes. 
See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 109-10. 
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further debate and revision within the Privy Council and each of the 
two Chambers of the Diet, during which its provenance remained a 
secret to the public and most members of the Diet.116 
There are recurring arguments by conservatives and nationalists 
within Japan that the Constitution lacks legitimacy precisely because 
it was initially written by Americans and imposed upon Japan. It is 
also sometimes argued, more technically, that it is illegitimate 
because it could not possibly constitute a valid “amendment” to the 
Meiji Constitution, not having conformed to the amendment 
procedure.117 This is not the place to make the fully developed 
counter-arguments to those claims, as the arguments are not central to 
the issues here, but it is worth addressing them both briefly. On the 
first point, it may be noted in passing that constitutions frequently and 
indeed quite typically arise in circumstances in which the authority of 
the drafters is very much in question—whether it is the aftermath of 
revolution or coup, or simply an amendment conference in which the 
delegates vastly exceed their mandate. As others have argued, it is not 
so much the process of inception or creation that determines the 
legitimacy of a constitution, as it is the process of ratification and 
subsequent acceptance and valid operation of the constitutional 
system.118 On this measure, the Constitution of Japan was markedly 
successful. It was not only ratified by overwhelming numbers in both 
Chambers of the Diet, but it was vocally embraced by the rank and 
file within the political world. The finalized document was 
promulgated in 1947, and it very quickly captured the imagination 
and overwhelming support of the people of Japan. 119 What is more, 
Article 9 became a constitutive norm that played an enormous role in 
shaping a national identity of post-war Japan that was imbued with 
pacifist values.120 As to the second point, it is probably true enough to 
say that the 1947 Constitution simply replaced the Meiji Constitution, 
notwithstanding the effort at the time to characterize the process as an 
amendment. 
                                                                                                             
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Christohper F. Zurn, The Logic of Legitimacy: Bootstrapping Paradoxes of 
Constitutional Democracy, 16 LEGAL THEORY 191 (2010). 
119.  MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 109. 
120.  PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICE 
AND MILITARY IN POSTWAR JAPAN 44 (1996); Martin, Binding the Dogs of War, supra note 
109, at 284-85. 
2017] REINTERPRETING JAPAN'S WAR POWERS 465 
Aside from Article 9, to which I will return shortly, the 
Constitution of Japan conforms to many of the ideas thought typical 
of the liberal democratic constitution. Notwithstanding its American 
origins, it was modeled on a Westminster parliamentary system of 
government, but in keeping with the ideals of its New Deal drafters it 
enshrined a strong set of individual rights, and provided for a robust 
power of judicial review. It provides (in Articles 97 through 99) that 
the Constitution is the supreme law of the land,121 and (in Articles 76 
and 81) that the judiciary, with the Supreme Court of Japan as the 
highest court, is to be both independent and charged with the 
authority to interpret and enforce this supreme law.122 The 
Constitution also provides for its own entrenchment, with the sole 
means of amendment laid out in Article 96, which requires that 
amendment proposals be initiated in the Diet and voted for by a two-
thirds majority in each chamber, following which it must be approved 
by a majority of votes cast in a referendum or election.123 According 
to well-regarded studies on the comparative difficulty of the 
amendment procedures of many of the liberal democratic 
constitutions of the world, the procedure in Article 96 is of average 
difficulty.124 Nonetheless, and notwithstanding considerable pressure 
from some quarters at various points over the last sixty-five years, the 
Constitution of Japan has never been amended. This is due to a 
complex set of political dynamics both among the factions of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”), which has governed Japan for 
almost sixty of the last sixty-five years, and among the LDP and the 
various opposition parties. Another significant factor has been the 
                                                                                                             
121.  See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. X, arts. 97-99 (Japan). 
122.  See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VI, arts. 76, 81 (Japan). 
123.  See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. IX, art. 96 (Japan). 
124.  See Lutz, Toward a Theory - Responding to Imperfection, supra note 1, at 260-61. 
See also Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 355, 362-64 (1994) [hereinafter Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment]; 
but see Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at 
All?: Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 14 INT’L J. 
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amendment difficulty, and suggesting that amendment culture is more important than 
amendment rules). 
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consistently strong public opinion opposed to any constitutional 
amendment, particularly of Article 9.125 
Article 9 gives expression to the second of the four principles 
initially laid down by MacArthur, and it is relatively unique in the 
world as a pre-commitment device prohibiting future governments 
from any involvement in war.126 The language of Article 9 was 
subject to considerable negotiation and revision, both between the 
Americans and Japanese during the initial translation process, and 
later during the debate and revision in the Diet. The final language in 
English is as follows: 
Chapter II. Renunciation of War 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.127 
 
There are three distinct elements to the provision: (i) the 
renunciation of war and the threat or use of force; (ii) the prohibition 
on the maintenance of armed forces or other war potential; and (iii) 
the non-recognition of the rights of belligerency. The first was drawn 
directly from the principles of the jus ad bellum regime in 
international law, incorporating the language of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact 1928128 and the then recently established UN Charter;129 the 
                                                                                                             
125.  For one of the best explanations of these dynamics, see generally J. PATRICK 
BOYD & RICHARD J. SAMUELS, NINE LIVES?: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN 
JAPAN (2005). 
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MCNELLY, supra note 109, at 106-13; SHŌICHI, supra note 109, at 83-86; Martin, Binding the 
Dogs of War, supra note 109, at 295 n.76. 
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128.  See General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy 
art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928], 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp. 
129.  See generally U.N. Charter, available at http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-
nations/. 
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second was a sui generis provision that has almost no equivalent in 
any other constitution;130 and the third is a unique incorporation of 
principles from the jus in bello regime aimed at buttressing the 
prohibition on the use of force in the first paragraph.131 It is the first 
paragraph and the first of these elements that has operated most 
effectively to constrain government policy—with the impressive 
result that Japan has not been a belligerent in any armed conflict since 
1945—and it is this paragraph that is the subject of the 
reinterpretation effort. The second element, the prohibition on the 
maintenance of armed forces, has typically attracted the most 
controversy, in ways that often cloud and confuse the discourse 
around Article 9, and this is no less true for the debate around the 
reinterpretation. The third element is quite often ignored, and as I 
have argued elsewhere, is often misunderstood.132 My primary focus 
here is what I will refer to as Article 9(1), and I will only mention the 
other two elements in Article 9(2) where it is necessary to clarify the 
relevant debate about the entire provision. 
B. The Government Interpretation and Operation of Article 9 
In order to understand the extent to which the recent 
reinterpretation has diverged from the long-established understanding 
of the provision, it is necessary to consider in some detail the 
government interpretation of Article 9.133 Similarly, I need to explain 
a little of its history in order to respond to arguments, made recently 
by some members of the LDP, that the interpretation of the provision 
has changed in the past and thus the recent reinterpretation effort 
should not be viewed as either unprecedented or extraordinary.134 
                                                                                                             
130.  The Constitution of Costa Rica is frequently cited as being one of the only 
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SECURITY, (May 15, 2014) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL REPORT 2014], available at 
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These latter arguments are misguided, for as I will explain below, the 
government interpretation of Article 9(1) has remained remarkably 
consistent in its essentials since it was formally established in 1954, 
very shortly after full sovereignty was restored to the country. While 
there has been some shifting in the national security posture and 
military capability permissible under the interpretation of Article 9(2), 
it has been in ways that were made possible by the elasticity built into 
the initial interpretation of the “no armed forces” element of Article 
9(2), rather than being developed through any extraordinary process 
resembling that which gave rise to the current reinterpretation. 
The arguments that the interpretation of Article 9(1) has 
previously changed are based in large part on the fact that Prime 
Minister Shigeru Yoshida had, during the initial ratification process in 
1946, taken the position that Japan was not necessarily denied the 
right of self-defense but that the point was moot because Japan would 
be denied the right to maintain even the most limited military forces 
necessary for self-defense.135 His government maintained that 
position against mounting pressure both inside the party and from the 
United States to begin re-arming Japan, but in 1954 he finally relented 
and the force that had been established in 1950 as a National Police 
Reserve was transformed into the Self-Defense Force (“SDF”).136 For 
constitutional legitimation of the move, Yoshida looked to the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (“CLB”) for a formal interpretation of 
Article 9. The CLB’s 1954 interpretation of Article 9 was the first 
formal interpretation of the provision based on careful legal analysis 
that had thus far been issued by any branch of government, and it was 
undertaken within less than two years of the country having had full 
sovereignty returned to it, and a mere seven years after the 
Constitution had been promulgated. The interpretation can thus be 
viewed as the establishment of the formal understanding during the 
period when constitutional meaning is most dynamic and is in the 
                                                                                                             
135.   See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 212; see also NISHI, CONSTITUTION 
AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 109, at 5, 100–02 (quoting 
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process of “settling.”137 The fact that there were differences between 
this initial CLB interpretation and comments made by the Prime 
Minister in the Diet during the ratification process, before the 
Constitution had even been promulgated, does not amount to a 
“reinterpretation” of the Constitution, and is certainly no precedent 
for the current effort. 
The CLB is an administrative agency attached to the Cabinet 
Secretariat and has been described as having greater prestige and 
greater independence than any other agency in the Japanese 
government.138 The predecessor to the CLB, established in the late 
Eighteenth Century, was modeled after the French Conseil d’Êtat, and 
it can also be loosely analogized to the Office of Legal Counsel in the 
US Department of Justice. It performs the fundamental role of vetting 
draft legislation for consistency with other laws and with the 
Constitution, and from time to time pronouncing on the proper 
interpretation of constitutional provisions.139 While it has no formal 
institutional authority specified in the Constitution, it has developed 
enormous respect and authority over the years as an independent 
agency within the government that serves as the guardian of the 
Constitution.140 Given that the Supreme Court took an increasingly 
passive and hands off approach to Article 9 after 1959 (as will be 
discussed further below), the CLB increasingly took on the role as the 
                                                                                                             
137.  See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 1460 (“[A] constitutional system is first getting 
underway and making its shakedown voyage, so to speak, amendments are more properly seen 
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138.  See Richard J. Samuels, Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau: Who Elected These Guys Anyway? 2 (Japanese Pol’y Res. Inst., Working Paper No. 
99, 2004), http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html (last visited Dec. 2016). 
139.  The Legislation Bureau had been disbanded by SCAP in 1947 but was restored 
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note 138, at 3. 
140.  More recently, see generally SHINICHI NISHIKAWA, KOREDE WAKATTA! NAIKAKU 
HŌSEIKYOKU [HERE UNDERSTOOD! THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU] (2013) (Japan) 
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THE DIGNITY OF THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU: REASONS WHY THE 
REINTERPRETATION IS UNACCEPTABLE] (2014) (Japan). 
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primary authority for the interpretation of Article 9, arbiter of what 
was consistent with that interpretation, and at times enforcer of the 
provision.141 
Turning to the content of the 1954 CLB interpretation, it 
provided that while Article 9(1) renounced war and the threat or use 
of force as a means of settling international disputes, it was not 
understood to renounce Japan’s inherent and sovereign right under 
international law to use force in the individual self-defense of Japan. 
Moreover, it was only natural for a country with such a right of self-
defense to have the capability necessary to defend its national 
territory in the event that it came under foreign attack. Thus it 
followed that Article 9(2) was not to be understood to prohibit the 
maintenance of the defensive capability “necessary” for such 
individual self-defense. Therefore, such “necessary” defense 
capability, which would comprise the new SDF, would not be 
understood to constitute the “land, sea, and air forces or other war 
potential” that was prohibited by Article 9(2).142 Put another way, the 
armed forces or other war potential prohibited by Article 9(2) was 
interpreted as being armed forces or weapons in excess of that which 
was necessary for individual self-defense. In 1957, the CLB refined 
and narrowed the interpretation further, opining that a defense 
capability that constituted “the minimum necessary force” for the 
exercise of self-defense was not the kind of war potential prohibited 
                                                                                                             
141.  See, e.g., NAKAMURA, supra note 139, at 3-6 (discussing the power and authority 
of the CLB), at 11-18 (discussing the independence of the CLB), and at 32-34 (arguing that the 
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142.  This interpretation was provided by Director Hayashi in the House of 
Representatives Budget Committee deliberations, on December 21, 1954. See NISHIKAWA, 
THE UNKNOWN AGENCY, supra note 139, at 40; see also BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 125, 
at 5, 24-29 (tracing the development of the “minimum necessary force” doctrine). 
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by Article 9(2).143 Japan was entitled to both maintain and to use the 
“minimum necessary force” for individual self-defense. 
The CLB interpretation of 1954 was extremely significant in 
terms of the constraints that it entrenched under Article 9(1). Though 
it defined what was permissible in the form of individual self-defense, 
the interpretation also made clear what was not permissible, namely 
collective self-defense and collective security operations.144 This is a 
crucial point that rests on distinctions between the different bases for 
the legitimate use of force in the modern jus ad bellum regime of 
international law. The language of Article 9 was drawn from the 
prohibition against the threat or use of force provided for in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. There are three exceptions to this broad 
prohibition. The first two, provided for in Article 51 of the Charter, 
are the right to use force for individual or collective self-defense, 
while the third is the use of force authorized by a resolution of the UN 
Security Council to restore or maintain international peace and 
security, as authorized under Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter.145  
While the two forms of self-defense are provided for in the same 
Article of the UN Charter, there are important differences between 
them, particularly for purposes of the interpretation of Article 9. The 
right of individual self-defense permits the use of force by a State to 
defend itself in the face of an armed attack against it by some 
aggressor. The right of collective self-defense permits a State to use 
force, alone or with others, to assist some other State that has been the 
victim of armed attack by some other aggressor, and has requested 
                                                                                                             
143.  Prime Minister Kishi provided this interpretation in the House of Councilors 
Cabinet Committee on May 7, 1957. See NISHIKAWA, THE UNKNOWN AGENCY, supra note 
139, at 41, and NISHIKAWA, HERE UNDERSTOOD, supra note 140, at 48-51. 
144.   NISHIKAWA, THE UNKNOWN AGENCY, supra note 139, at 46, NISHIKAWA, HERE 
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right of individual and collective self-defense being one, and collective security operations 
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and given the importance of those differences for purposes of Article 9, I am here 
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AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (2005); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
USE OF FORCE (2004); and for my own analysis of Article 9 from an international law 
perspective, see Martin, Binding the Dogs of War, supra note 109, at 309 passim. 
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assistance.146 The use of force in either collective self-defense or for 
purposes of collective security operations authorized by the UN 
Security Council is part of the collective security system developed as 
part of the UN system. The CLB interpretation made clear that Article 
9(1) renounced, as sovereign rights of the nation, and thus prohibited, 
the use of force for either of these collective security purposes. 
Indeed, for many years this interpretation operated to effectively 
constrain SDF participation in even those UN peacekeeping 
operations that were not conducted under Chapter VII authority, 
which are not typically understood to constitute a use of force under 
international law.147 
It will be noted that while the interpretation of Article 9(1) 
articulated a fairly clear rule (namely, no use of force except for 
individual self-defense), the interpretation of Article 9(2) created a 
rather vague and relative standard for what was a permissible size and 
capability of the armed forces, constituting a sliding scale that 
required reference to external threat levels. The CLB justification for 
the establishment and maintenance of the SDF has long been assailed 
by scholars inside and outside Japan as being contrary to the purpose 
and text of the Article 9(2) prohibition on the maintenance of armed 
forces.148 Moreover, the relative nature of the standard is what made 
possible the several changes in defense posture over the years, which 
defenders of the current reinterpretation now claim constituted 
previous “reinterpretations” of Article 9.149 
                                                                                                             
146.   See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 145; GRAY, supra note 145; and for my own 
analysis of Article 9 from an international law perspective, see Martin, Binding the Dogs of 
War, supra note 109, at 309 passim. 
147.  For more on the relationship between Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping 
and Article 9, see, e.g., Caroline Rose, Japanese Role in PKO and Humanitarian Assistance, 
in JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY TODAY: A READER 122, 124 (Takashi Inoguchi & Purnendra 
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James E. Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69, 
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by which Article 9(2) was reinterpreted). There is a massive body of literature in Japanese 
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149.   For an examination of and response to these arguments, see NISHIKAWA, HERE 
UNDERSTOOD, supra note 140, at 132-47. 
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While debate has raged for decades over what, precisely, a 
“minimum necessary force” might mean in practical terms, and 
whether the SDF has exceeded it, the fact remains that the CLB has 
been remarkably consistent in its adherence to the fundamental 
interpretation of the “use of force” aspect of its understanding of 
Article 9. While there has been some whittling away of the policy 
limitations once imposed on the overseas dispatch of troops for UN 
peacekeeping operations, and the conditions under which Japan might 
be able to provide rear-area support to the United States in crisis 
circumstances in “areas surrounding Japan,”150 the fundamental 
prohibition on participation in collective self-defense or UN 
authorized collective security operations has been assiduously 
maintained.151 Even when the limitations were relaxed with respect to 
the dispatch of troops for UN peacekeeping missions, and to provide 
logistical support for such operations as the post-9/11 coalition 
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, stringent conditions on SDF 
operations were designed and implemented to keep their conduct 
within the scope of the broader constitutional interpretation.152 
What is more, this interpretation has operated to constrain 
policy. The fact that Japan has not engaged in the use of force since 
World War II—a feat that is almost unique among the major 
industrial nations—was not the result of mere policy choice or 
preference. Article 9(1) has operated in precisely the manner for 
which pre-commitment devices are designed, effectively constraining 
government policy and preventing the use of force, even in perceived 
crisis conditions when the government was under great pressure to 
participate in international collective security operations. The most 
famous and clear illustration of this was when the Kaifu 
administration was under enormous pressure from the Administration 
of George H.W. Bush and the US Congress to contribute troops to the 
international effort to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the Gulf War 
                                                                                                             
150.  The “rear-area support” and “situations in areas surrounding Japan” are concepts 
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infra. 
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in collective self-defense was prohibited by Article 9(1). See BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 
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152.  For details on these operations and the limits thereon, see Martin, Binding the 
Dogs of War, supra note 109, at 321 passim. 
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of 1991.153 The government was inclined to accede to US requests, 
until the Director of the CLB informed Prime Minister Kaifu that any 
such participation would be a violation of the Article 9(1) prohibition 
against the use of force for anything other than individual self-
defense. There was a growing sense of crisis within the Japanese 
government, with the view that failure to participate would do 
irreparable harm to the alliance with the United States, but the 
government nonetheless respected the CLB view and complied with 
the understood constitutional limits.154 Regardless of whether one 
views this constraint on policy to have been in the national interest, 
the evidence is fairly clear that it was effective. 
Factions within the ruling LDP have sought for decades to 
amend Article 9. This has proved impossible for complex political 
reasons involving both dynamics among factions within the party and 
among the LDP and the opposition parties, as well as enduring public 
resistance to the idea.155 The myth has thus arisen that the formal 
amendment procedure in the Constitution is simply too difficult, and 
that other means of revision are thus justified.156 But as mentioned 
previously, the comparative analysis of the relative difficulty of 
constitutional amendment procedures indicates that, at least as a 
structural matter, the Constitution of Japan is merely average.157 The 
constitutions of several countries, such as the United States and 
Germany, are significantly more difficult to amend,158 and have 
nonetheless been formally amended many times. That said, the 
                                                                                                             
153. There are differences of opinion among international law scholars whether this 
operation constituted an exercise of collective self-defense under Article 51 or a collective 
security operation authorized by Article 42, or both—but it was certainly at least one of these. 
See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 145, at 273-77 (arguing that it was an act of collective self-
defense) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 24-30 (2002) (arguing that it was an instance of collective security 
authorized under Article 42). 
154.  See generally KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN RISING: THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE 
POWER AND PURPOSE (2007); Martin, Binding the Dogs of War, supra note 109, at 343 
passim, relying on KAZUHIKO TOGO, JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 1945-2003 (2d ed. 2005); 
Samuels, supra note 138. 
155.  See generally BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 125. 
156.  See generally GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN’S CONTESTED 
CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS (2001). 
157.  See Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, supra note 124. 
158.  See id. 
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Constitution of Japan has never been amended in its almost seventy 
years of existence, and as such is a significant outlier.159 
C. The Process of Reinterpretation 
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, beginning during his first term as 
prime minister in 2007, decided to make revision of Article 9 one of 
his primary objectives.160 He paid lip service to the ongoing efforts to 
formally amend the provision in accordance with the procedure laid 
out in Article 96 of the Constitution, but he also set out to circumvent 
and subvert that legitimate procedure if necessary. He lay the 
foundation for a “reinterpretation” process by establishing an ad hoc 
Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security 
(the “Advisory Panel”, also known as the “Yanai Committee”, named 
after its chairman Shunji Yanai).161 This was a group of experts in 
fields from international relations and diplomacy to international law, 
but nonetheless contained few lawyers, and only one constitutional 
scholar.162 It was argued in the media that members of the panel were 
primarily selected for their hawkish views on national security.163 It 
was given a mandate to provide recommendations on how, not 
whether, Article 9 should be reinterpreted.164 Before it could finish its 
work, however, Abe had to resign on grounds of ill health, and his 
successor quietly shelved the first report of the Advisory Panel. 
Efforts at constitutional revision of any kind were put on hold. 
                                                                                                             
159.  See generally GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 1. 
160.  Consistent with the vision of the country he laid out in his 2006 book: SHINZŌ 
ABE, UTSUKUSHII KUNI HE [Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan] (2006). 
161. Abe Shapes Agenda for Defense Panel, ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 19, 2007. 
162.  A list of the members can be found at the back of the 2008 report of the 
committee. See THE ADVISORY PANEL ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR 
SECURITY, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL BASIS 
FOR SECURITY (June 24, 2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, 2008], 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou/report.pdf (last visited Dec. 2016). 
163. Abe’s Panel on Defense Dominated by Hawks, JAPAN TIMES, May 6, 2007, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/05/06/national/abes-panel-on-defense-dominated-by-
hawks/ (last visited Dec. 2016). 
164. Yanai Committee Mandate, Order of the Prime Minister, April 17, 2007. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou/konkyo.pdf. In 2007 I published an essay critical 
of the effort to then “revise” the interpretation of Article 9. See Craig Martin, The Case 
Against Revising Interpretations of the Japanese Constitution, 5:5 ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN 
FOCUS, May 2007, http://apjjf.org/-Craig-Martin/2434/article.pdf (last visited Dec. 2016). 
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Upon returning to power in 2012, Abe immediately revived his 
efforts to change Article 9. The LDP published a proposal for the 
amendment of the Constitution, which included extensive revisions to 
not only Article 9, but individual rights and various other aspects of 
the Constitution.165 He also revived the Advisory Panel and gave it a 
renewed and broadened mandate to update its prior report.166 When it 
soon became apparent that amendment of Article 9 would again prove 
too difficult, Abe proposed to first amend only the amending formula 
in Article 96 itself, so as to make amendment of the Constitution 
possible with a bare majority vote in each chamber of the Diet, and 
approval by a majority of votes cast in a referendum.167 This move 
was quite transparently made for the purpose of laying the foundation 
for then more easily amending Article 9. The proposal was heavily 
criticized by Japanese scholars, as it would have had the effect of 
undermining the Constitution’s status as the supreme law, and its 
ability to provide effective constraints on government power.168 While 
it still lingers in the background of government constitutional 
commentary, the effort was shelved in 2013 as a result of the 
opposition, and Abe reverted to the plan-B of orchestrating a 
                                                                                                             
165.  JIMINTŌ, KENPŌ KAISEI SŌAN [LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL], 2012, http://constitution.jimin.jp/draft/. For a more extensive Q&A 
document explaining the proposal, see JIMINTŌ, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ KAISEI SOAN Q&A, 
[LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, JAPAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL Q&A], 
https://www.jimin.jp/policy/pamphlet/pdf/kenpou_qa.pdf. For my essay analyzing the 
proposal, see Craig Martin, LDP’s Dangerous Proposals for Amending Antiwar Article, JAPAN 
TIMES (June 6, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/06/06/opinion/ldps-
dangerous-proposals-for-amending-antiwar-article/, and a more recent article, Craig Martin, 
Change it to Save it: Why and How to Amend Article 9, 17 RITSUMEIKAN J. PEACE STUD. 
(forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588; see also 
Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals 
for Constitutional Change, 11:28 ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN FOCUS, July 2013, 
http://apjjf.org/2013/11/28/Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.html. 
166.   Mizuho Aoki, Clearing the Way for Wider Military Role, THE JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 
19, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/19/reference/clearing-way-for-wider-
military-role/ (last visited Dec. 2016); all the documents of the re-constituted ad-hoc Advisory 
Panel can be found on the webpage of the Kantei: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp
/singi/anzenhosyou2/index.html. 
167.  Jiji, Article 96 Invites Sent Out to Ishin, Your Party, JAPAN TIMES (May 5, 2013), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/05/national/politics-diplomacy/article-96-invites-
sent-out-to-ishin-your-party/#.VeZjGdNVhBc. 
168.  Back to the Future: Shinzo Abe’s Plan to Re-Write Japan’s Constitution is 
Running Into Trouble, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/
21578712-shinzo-abes-plan-rewrite-japans-constitution-running-trouble-back-future. 
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reinterpretation of Article 9. The work of the Advisory Panel thus 
took center stage. 
While the Advisory Panel got back to work, Prime Minister Abe 
made one more move to lay the foundation for his reinterpretation 
efforts. In 2013, he asked for the resignation of the Director of the 
CLB and replaced him with the political appointment of an outsider, a 
diplomat from the Foreign Ministry named Ichiro Komatsu.169 This 
was an unprecedented departure from a long-standing convention of 
appointing legal experts from within the ranks of CLB, and 
sometimes from among former Supreme Court Judges or from within 
the Ministry of Justice.170 The appointment of Komatsu, who was 
known to be a supporter of the reinterpretation efforts, was criticized 
by many at the time as being a cynical and transparent effort to pre-
empt any possible challenge the CLB might have otherwise made to 
the constitutionality of the planned reinterpretation.171 As it turned 
out, Komatsu himself had to resign in 2014 due to ill health, but it is 
thought that he had by then done the important work of laying the 
groundwork for acceptance of the reinterpretation. Many prominent 
Japanese scholars have argued that the political interference not only 
broke the CLB’s potential resistance on this particular issue, but has 
grievously weakened and undermined the integrity of the institution 
within the constitutional system as a whole.172 
The Advisory Panel, now under the effective leadership of 
Shinichi Kitaoka, submitted a revised and updated final report in 
May, 2014.173 As will be discussed in more detail below, this ad-hoc 
committee was an extra-constitutional body with no authority 
whatsoever to engage in constitutional interpretation, but was formed 
to provide a veneer of authority and legitimacy for subsequent 
executive moves to effect a reinterpretation of Article 9. On the basis 
                                                                                                             
169.  Abe to Pick Backer of Collective Self-Defense as Head of Legislation Bureau, 
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Aug. 2, 2013). 
170.  Abe to Pick Backer of Collective Self-Defense, supra note 169. For detailed 
discussion of the convention and criticism of the appointment by Abe, see NISHIKAWA, HERE 
UNDERSTOOD!, supra note 140, ch. 2. 
171.  Abe’s Personnel Move Could Hamper Constitutional Debate, ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(Aug. 3, 2013); See also NISHIKAWA, HERE UNDERSTOOD!, supra note 140, ch 2. 
172.  Yasuo Hasebe, The End of Constitutional Pacifism? (Aug. 12, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript, presented at the University of New South Wales Faculty of Law) (on file with 
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of the “recommendations” of the Advisory Panel (though, to be fair, 
not implementing all of its recommendations), the Cabinet in July 
2014 passed a resolution as the mechanism for purporting to 
unilaterally change the meaning of Article 9.174 This “Cabinet 
Decision” provided both the rationale for a reinterpretation of the 
provision, and an outline for how key legislation would be revised to 
facilitate and enable an expanded national security posture. The 
rationale for the reinterpretation was essentially that which had been 
provided by the Advisory Panel, namely that the strategic 
environment around Japan had become more threatening, and that the 
government’s obligation to guarantee the security of the Japanese 
people required a more robust national security posture, and 
particularly the development of a more proactive role within the US-
Japan security arrangements.175 In short, it was a transparently result-
oriented argument that the situation had changed so as to require 
greater latitude in the use of military force, and therefore the meaning 
of Article 9 must be deemed to have changed in a manner that would 
allow such a use of force. The Cabinet Decision laid out three basic 
categories of policy for which legislation would be developed to 
achieve the new policy objectives, and for which a new interpretation 
of Article 9 would be required. In order to later assess the 
constitutionality of the reinterpretation, these must be examined here 
in some detail. 
The first category related to the use of the SDF in response to 
“an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack.” Such use 
of the military is to be permitted in “situations that are neither pure 
peacetime nor contingencies.” The word “contingencies” is taken 
from the formal Cabinet translation of the Cabinet Decision, but it 
represents the word yūji in Japanese, which might be better translated 
as “emergency”, though in this context the word would appear to have 
a meaning that is closer to “hostilities” or “armed conflict”. As an 
aside, this is merely one example of the incredibly euphemistic 
terminology, in both languages, that is employed in both the Cabinet 
Decision and the U.S-Japan Guidelines (which will be examined 
further below), such that one might suspect it is quite deliberately 
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175.  Id. at 2. 
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designed to obfuscate.176 But returning to the substance of this change 
articulated in the Cabinet Decision, it provides that the use of force in 
circumstances that do not involve an armed attack would include 
responses to “infringements” that occur in the areas “surrounding 
remote islands”, and in circumstances in which the police are not able 
to effectively respond.177 It is likely that this policy change is 
precisely to provide authority to use force in response to any Chinese 
encroachments in the area of such islands as the Senkaku chain, over 
which China and Japan have ongoing territorial disputes.178 This 
section of the Cabinet Decision also provides that Japan could use 
force to provide assistance to US forces that had come under attack 
while engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan, 
but not necessarily in the territory of Japan.179 
The second category of policy for which new legislation would 
be required, according to the Cabinet Decision, is to further Japan’s 
contributions to “the peace and stability of the international 
community.”180 This policy development is to permit an expansion of 
the scope and nature of logistical and rear-area support to foreign 
armed forces engaged in hostilities.181 Japan has in the past imposed 
stringent limits on such support, with the view that extensive 
logistical support and transport assistance for the armed forces of 
belligerents may be deemed “integral” to the use of force by such 
foreign armed forces, and thus prohibited by Article 9. Indeed, in a 
notorious decision in 2008 the Nagoya High Court opined (in what 
was extensive obiter dicta, in a judgment that ultimately dismissed 
the claim of the applicants for lack of standing) that Japanese support 
for coalition forces during the belligerent occupation of Iraq 
                                                                                                             
176.  This is not a new phenomenon. The 1997 Guidelines themselves were also 
excessively and deliberately ambiguous, leading to controversy when the Japanese 
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177.  CABINET DECISION, supra note 24, at 3. 
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beginning in 2005, constituted action that was integral to the use of 
force by coalition forces and was thus a violation of Article 9.182 The 
Cabinet Decision purported to revise the interpretation of these limits, 
and particularly this concept of integration with the use of force by 
other belligerents to an armed conflict (known in Japanese as the 
“ittaika” doctrine). Under the new revised understanding, Japanese 
support for the armed forces of other countries would only constitute 
an integral component of their use of force if the support was 
provided directly to foreign armed forces actually operating in active 
theatres of combat. Providing such support for armed forces behind 
the lines, or on their way to the theatre of conflict, would not 
constitute a use of force under the new interpretation. 183 
The third category in the Cabinet Decision, the “Measures for 
Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9”, was the most controversial. 
Noting that “sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if 
the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained,” the Cabinet 
Decision purported to expand the scope of Article 9 to permit the use 
of force in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.184 This, 
of course, makes permissible a form of use of force that was precisely 
understood to be prohibited under the long-standing interpretation of 
Article 9. The Cabinet Decision made some effort to justify this move 
in constitutional terms, by reference to the preamble and Article 13 of 
the Constitution. The preamble refers to the “right to live in peace”, 
and Article 13 provides that the people’s “right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with 
the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and 
other governmental affairs.”185 Thus, the Cabinet Decision argued, 
“Article 9 cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking 
measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security 
and to ensure its survival.”186 It suggested that the only change now 
was that collective self-defense was deemed necessary, in some 
                                                                                                             
182.  See Nagoya High Court, 2056 Hanrei-jiho 74 (2008), available at 
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circumstances, to maintain peace and security, ensure the survival of 
Japan, and preserve the people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of 
happiness.187 
In accordance with this logic, however, the government 
developed a concept of collective self-defense that is quite different in 
scope and contour from the understanding of the concept in 
international law. The Cabinet Decision qualified the concept by 
adding certain conditions precedent and apparent limitations, thus 
creating a sui generis concept of collective self-defense for the 
purpose of the reinterpreted substance of Article 9. Indeed, the 
Cabinet Decision explicitly stated that “a legal basis in international 
law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood 
separately.”188 Thus, the use of force in the exercise of this sui generis 
right of collective self-defense is only permissible in circumstances in 
which there has been an armed attack against “a foreign country that 
is in a close relationship with Japan,” and when such an attack is one 
that “threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to 
fundamentally overturn [the] people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit 
of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available 
to repel the attack.”189 The Cabinet Decision also noted that the use of 
force in response must be the minimum necessary for the defense of 
Japan. Finally, it specified that the enabling legislation would include 
the condition that “in principle” the Diet should be required to 
approve any such use of force.190 These limits were subsequently 
articulated by the government as constituting three clear and distinct 
conditions precedent to the use of force for collective self-defense, 
namely: (i) an armed attack on a country with close relations to Japan, 
and such attack poses a threat to Japan’s survival and the rights of the 
people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; (ii) there is no 
other means available to protect against the threat to Japan and its 
people; and (iii) the use of force is the minimum necessary for such 
defense and proportionate to the threat.191 
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This limitation of the use of force to situations in which Japan or 
its people are threatened by the attack on a foreign state was, it has 
been suggested by government representatives, designed to make for 
a narrower or more limited concept than the right of collective self-
defense under international law. The latter, of course, permits the use 
of force against an aggressor that has attacked a third country, 
regardless of any threat posed to the state using force under this 
justification, or the nature of the relationship between the victim and 
the country exercising the right. 192 But how the government’s new 
conception of collective self-defense would operate in practice is 
unclear at best, and indeed the actual intent of the language itself is 
far from clear. Would armed attack against an ally have to pose a 
threat to both the survival of Japan and the people’s right to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or would a threat to the people’s 
rights be sufficient to trigger the right to use force? If so, how would 
the standard be defined and applied in practical terms? The Prime 
Minister has made comments that suggest just such a “disconnection” 
of the conditions, and I will return to these questions below when the 
examination turns to the enabling legislation, and to the analysis of 
how the constitutionality of the reinterpretation should be assessed.193 
Such was the Cabinet Decision itself. Next, in April 2015, prior 
to tabling any draft legislation or providing any other opportunity for 
debate on the reinterpretation issues in the Diet, the Abe government 
moved to commit the country to these policy changes in an 
international agreement. The government entered into talks with the 
US for the purpose of revising the formal guidelines that flesh out the 
mutual obligations, expectations, and responsibilities under the US-
Japan Security Treaty. The existing Guidelines for Japan-US Defense 
Cooperation, as the agreement is titled, was agreed to in 1997 (the 
“1997 Guidelines”), and reflected a shared understanding regarding 
the limitations on Japan’s ability to use force, provide logistical 
support or deploy the SDF in accordance with treaty obligations.194 
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The April 2015 talks led to an agreement, the 2015 Guidelines, which 
was finalized without any Diet deliberation, and which reflected a 
marked expansion of the limitations in the 1997 Guidelines.195  
The 2015 Guidelines pay lip-service to the idea that the 
fundamental rights and obligations under the treaty remained 
unchanged, that no legislation is required to implement the 
agreement, and that all actions and activities undertaken by Japan 
would be consistent with the Japanese Constitution.196 Yet it was later 
revealed that during the talks senior Japanese military officials 
advised their US counterparts that the government could guarantee 
that the Cabinet Decision and the 2015 Guidelines would be 
implemented in the form of legislation that would be enacted in the 
coming summer.197 Moreover, in the details of the agreement, the 
revised Guidelines actually reflect the expanded scope and role of the 
SDF articulated in the Cabinet Decision, stipulating that Japan may 
use force in response to infringements that do not involve an armed 
attack on Japan,198 and that Japan and the US could cooperate in 
anticipatory self-defense, in response to either an imminent attack on 
Japan,199 or indeed any “situation that will have an important 
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influence on Japan’s peace and security.”200 The 2015 Guidelines also 
commit Japan to conducting bilateral operations to “secure the safety 
of sea lines of communication,”201 and quite explicitly eliminate any 
geographic limits (which had been controversially ambiguous in the 
1997 Guidelines). The 2015 Guidelines also clearly reflect and 
operationalize the Cabinet Decision in an entirely new section (as 
compared to the 1997 Guidelines), under the title “Actions in 
Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan.”202 
This section recognizes and implements the new policy position that 
would permit Japan to engage in the use of force for purposes of 
collective self-defense, using precisely the same language as was 
promulgated in the Cabinet Decision.203 It provides a number of 
examples of how the armed forces of the two countries would 
cooperate in the exercise of collective self-defense, including the 
protection of US armed forces’ assets, ballistic missile defense, and 
the securing of sea-lanes, including minesweeping operations.204 
Finally, in May 2015 the government submitted to the Diet the 
proposed national security legislation that would formally implement 
the changes to national security policy and posture reflected in the 
Cabinet Decision and the 2015 Guidelines. The draft legislation was 
in the form of two bills,205 the first of which was an omnibus bill that 
would implement significant revisions to ten existing national security 
laws.206 The revisions to these laws effectively implemented the 
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205.  The bills, the short titles of which are Heiwa Anzenhosei Seibiho [Law for the 
maintenance of the peace and security legal system], and Kokusai Heiwa Shijiho [International 
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206.  These included, most significantly, the Self-Defense Forces Law (Jieitaihō, Law 
No. 164, 1954), the Maintaining Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan Law 
(shūhenjitai ni saishite wagakuni no heiwa oyobi anzen wo kakuhosuru tame no sochi ni 
kansuru hōritsu, Law No. 64, 1999), the Maintaining Peace and Security in the Event of 
Armed Attack Law (Buryoku kōgeki jitai ni okeru wagakuni no heiwa to dokuritsu narabini 
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policies outlined in the Cabinet Decision outlined earlier. The second 
bill was for the creation of an entirely new law, the International 
Peace Support Law,207 which would among other things create 
permanent authority for the government to deploy the SDF for 
participation in “international cooperation activities” upon a simple 
up or down vote of approval by the Diet. This would displace the 
current convention that requires the Diet to pass special laws 
authorizing the deployment of the SDF for each and every mission, 
with detailed limits on the scope of operations and the activity of the 
SDF units being deployed.208 
As the debate over these bills developed during the summer of 
2015, it provoked increasing public and professional opposition. By 
the time that they were finally passed in the Upper House, at 2:05 
a.m. on September 19, there had been tens of thousands of people 
protesting in the streets of Tokyo and other major cities, and there had 
been a brawl among members of the Diet in the Upper House over 
efforts to delay the vote.209 Polls during the summer consistently 
showed that well over fifty percent of the population was opposed to 
the legislation.210 The public opposition was spurred by surprising 
                                                                                                             
kuni oyobi kokumin no anzen no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu, Law No. 79, 2003), 
Implementation of Measures by Japan in Relation to the Activities of the U.S. Armed Forces in 
a Situation of Armed Attack Law (buryoku kōgeki jitai ni okeru amerika gōshūkoku no guntai 
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the National Security Council Establishment Law (Kokka anzen hoshō kaigi secchihō, Law No. 
71, 1961). 
207.  The full title of the law is Kokusai Heiwa Kyōdōtaisho jittai ni saishite Waga Kuni 
ga jisshisuru Shogaikoku no Guntai nadoni taisuru Kyōryoku Shijikatsudō nado ni kansuru 
Hōritsu [Law Related to the Implementation of Japan’s Cooperative Support for the Armed 
Forces of Foreign Countries in Circumstances of International Peace and Security Cooperation 
Activity]. 
208.  For my discussion of this convention, see Craig Martin, Permanent SDF Overseas 
Deployment Law Endangers Democracy, JAPAN TIMES (May 21, 2008), 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2008/05/21/commentary/world-commentary/permanent-
sdf-overseas-deployment-law-endangers-democracy/. 
209.  Reiji Yoshida & Mizuho Aoki, Amid Angry Scenes, Ruling Parties Force Security 
Bills Through Lower House Committee, JAPAN TIMES (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/15/national/politics-diplomacy/amid-angry-scenes-
ruling-parties-force-security-bills-lower-house-committee/#.V_PR_jKZOqA; Tomohiro Osaki, 
Thousands Protest Abe, Security Bills at Diet Rally, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/30/national/thousands-protest-abe-security-bills-
diet-rally/#.V_PSIDKZOqA. 
210.  Takashi Nakamichi, Support for Abe Falls to Lowest Level on Security Bills, 
WALL ST. J. (Jul. 19, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/07/19/support-for-abe-
falls-to-lowest-level-on-security-bills/; Satoru Mori, The New Security Legislation and 
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levels of professional criticism and objection. Three former directors 
of the CLB publicly voiced their view that provisions of the bills were 
unconstitutional.211 A former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
similarly pronounced that the draft legislation was unconstitutional.212 
The incident that galvanized the media and drew the most attention to 
the questioned constitutionality of the bills, and thereby catalyzed 
much of this opposition, was the testimony in June by three very 
prominent constitutional scholars in the Diet Constitutional 
Commission hearings. All three scholars, including Professor Yasuo 
Hasebe of Waseda University, who was ostensibly there as the 
nominee of the governing LDP, testified quite emphatically that the 
draft legislation would be unconstitutional if enacted.213 In the wake 
of this testimony, which was front page news for several days, over 
two hundred constitutional scholars came forth to support their 
position, and the government was hard-pressed to find a couple of law 
professors from lesser universities who would voice tepid support for 
the legitimacy of the legislation.214 
Notwithstanding the protests and resistance in the summer of 
2015, less than a year later, in July, 2016, the governing LDP was 
                                                                                                             
Japanese Public Reaction, TOKYO FOUNDATION, Dec. 2, 2015, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-legislation-and-public-reaction. 
211.  Kotaro Ono, Former Legislation Bureau Chiefs Criticize Security Bills as Placing 
Citizens in Danger, ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 22, 2015); SAKATA, supra note 140, (Sakata is 
himself a former Director General of the CLB). 
212.  Former Justice Brands Security Bills as Unconstitutional, Slams Abe for 
Sophistry, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/
national/politics-diplomacy/ex-justice-brands-security-bills-unconstitutional-upper-house-hits-
abe-duping-public/#.V_PVNTKZO8U; Ex-Chief Justice Blasts Abe’s Lack of Respect for 
Constitutionalism, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Sept. 3, 2015) . 
213.  See id. (The other two scholars were Eiji Sasada, also of Waseda University, and 
Setsu Kobayashi of Keio University); see also Constitutional Law Scholars Lash Out at 
Government Criticism, Insults, ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 16, 2015). 
214.  Two Legal Experts Defend Constitutionality of Contentious Security Bills, JAPAN 
TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/20/national/politics-
diplomacy/two-experts-defend-constitutionality-contentious-security-bills/#.V_PYCjKZO8U. 
The two scholars were Osamu Nishi, professor emeritus of Komazawa University, who is a 
long-standing champion of constitutional revision; and Akira Momochi, of Nihon University. 
Meanwhile it was reported that as of the week following the testimony of the three scholars, 
fully 225 constitutional law scholars had signed a joint statement condemning the 
reinterpretation as unconstitutional. See Reiji Yoshida, Japan Security Bills Reveal 
Irreconcilable Divide Between Scholars, Politicians, JAPAN TIMES (June 12, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/12/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-security-
bills-reveal-irreconcilable-divide-scholars-politicians/#.V_PY9TKZO8U. 
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massively successful in the Upper House elections. The LDP had not 
enjoyed a majority in the Upper House since before 2000, but in the 
2016 elections it not only obtained a majority, but together with the 
Komeitō, its coalition partner, it finally obtained the long-elusive two-
thirds majority. Thus, for the first time the LDP was within striking 
distance of having the two-thirds majority within both chambers of 
the Diet necessary to initiate and approve a proposal to amend the 
Constitution. It might be tempting to see the election as thus having 
been an expression of public approval of the reinterpretation, or at the 
very least an acquiescence to it. I will return to this point in more 
detail below,215 but as a factual matter it is important to note that the 
LDP quite prominently avoided discussion of constitutional issues in 
the election campaign. The focus was on economic issues, and there 
was virtually no mention of either the reinterpretation, the national 
security legislation, or of possibly amending the Constitution going 
forward.216 Indeed, just days prior to the election, a representative of 
the government stated emphatically that there was “zero prospect” of 
amending the Constitution.217 While few experts took this at face 
value, it does tend to undermine any argument that the election result 
was a either a mandate for change, or a reflection of public approval 
of the reinterpretation. It was more a reflection of the Japanese 
people’s strong sense that there were few viable alternatives.218 
A final consideration, of course, is how the courts will respond 
when the revised laws are challenged, as they inevitably will be if the 
government takes military action in accordance with those aspects of 
the revised laws that are considered unconstitutional under the 
established interpretation of Art. 9.219 Past experience would suggest 
                                                                                                             
215.  See discussion infra Section III.A. 
216.  Tomohiro Osaki, LDP-led Ruling Bloc, Allies Clear Two-Thirds Majority Hurdle 
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that the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, are unlikely to 
strike down provisions of the new legislation. This is primarily 
because the Supreme Court has, in the infamous Naganuma case, set 
the bar so high for standing in any Article 9 based challenge that it is 
difficult to imagine a scenario in which any likely applicant could 
clear the hurdle.220 In the unlikely event that a challenge did get 
passed the standing obstacles, the prospects for success on the merits 
would be still very uncertain. 
As mentioned earlier, the Nagoya High Court in 2008 famously 
opined (albeit in obiter dicta that was severely criticized by the 
government) that the SDF provision of logistical support for the 
armed forces of the US and coalition partners in the belligerent 
occupation of Iraq was integral to the use of force by those foreign 
forces, and thus was in violation of Art. 9(1).221 This was an 
affirmation of the “ittaika” (or “integral use of force”) doctrine that 
the Cabinet Decision explicitly rejected. 
The Supreme Court, however, has been far more cautious and 
deferential than the lower courts even when it has reached the 
substantive issues related to Article 9. The only Supreme Court 
decision that has squarely considered the interpretation and operation 
of Art. 9, the notorious Sunagawa case of 1959, involved the question 
of whether the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the presence of the US 
armed forces in Japan, violated the Art. 9(2) prohibition against 
maintaining armed forces or other war potential. In deciding the case 
the Court adopted in obiter dicta the CLB interpretation that Japan 
retained a right of individual self-defense. The narrow ratio decidendi 
of the judgment was that the US forces were not being maintained by 
Japan, and so could not constitute a maintenance of armed forces or 
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221.  Nagoya Decision, supra note 182. See Craig Martin, Rule of Law Comes Under 
Fire: Government Response to High Court Ruling on SDF Operations in Iraq, JAPAN TIMES 
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other war potential in violation of Art. 9(2). But the majority of the 
Court went further than necessary, and purported to employ a thin 
facsimile of the US political question doctrine to also hold that the 
judiciary should play no role in determining the constitutionality of 
government action in the national security realm unless such action 
was “obviously unconstitutional.”222 The dissent was scathing in its 
criticism of this aspect of the judgment, and the Court has never again 
invoked the political question doctrine, but the precedent remains—
and it is unclear whether a timid and conservative Court would find 
the reinterpretation to be “obviously unconstitutional.” 
In my view, the primary reason for Abe’s appointment of the 
Advisory Panel, and his attempt to manipulate CLB support for the 
reinterpretation, both of which would lead to recommendations and 
opinions in support of the constitutionality of the reinterpretation, was 
to make it more difficult for the Supreme Court to subsequently find 
that the reinterpretation, while inconsistent with the text and long-
established understanding of Article 9, is “obviously 
unconstitutional.” But given the extraordinary criticism of the 
reinterpretation by prominent constitutional scholars, former 
Directors of the CLB, and even a retired Supreme Court Justice, there 
will be strong cross-cutting pressure on the Supreme Court if it 
receives a case that it cannot dismiss on standing or other doctrinal 
grounds. While precedent would suggest that a ruling of 
unconstitutionality is unlikely, it is not entirely implausible. 
III. THE REINTERPRETATION, INFORMAL AMENDMENT, AND 
LEGITIMACY 
This examination of the reinterpretation efforts in Japan should 
leave us with some obvious questions. To begin with, how should this 
reinterpretation effort be characterized? Is it the kind of interpretive 
move that falls within the range of incremental evolutionary change in 
interpretation that is considered normal and entirely legitimate in 
most liberal democratic constitutional systems? If not, why not, and 
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what then is it? Is it an informal amendment in line with the theories 
we examined in Part I? If so, is it thereby legitimate, and how do we 
know either way? And as raised at the outset, how do the factors of 
deliberate agency and popular will interact to affect the legitimacy of 
such a intentional  constitutional change? How will it be seen over 
time? Thinking these questions through should contribute to our 
understanding of how these determinations get made and the lines 
drawn in informal amendment theory, and more importantly, how we 
should assess the legitimacy of informal amendments in general 
terms. It will also leave us with some thoughts on how to assess the 
legitimacy of the Japanese reinterpretation specifically. 
A. The Reinterpretation as Normal Interpretive Move 
In this section I will begin with the first of these questions, 
namely whether the reinterpretation constitutes a valid and legitimate 
interpretive move within Japan’s constitutional system. The 
reinterpretation only becomes relevant to theories of informal 
amendment, after all, if it is not a normal interpretive development of 
the constitution, so we must first resolve that question. As I have 
suggested earlier, one of ironies of the debate over informal 
amendment is that those who oppose the very existence of the concept 
are somewhat more forgiving in their characterization of interpretive 
moves. That is, they are willing to accept rather radical constitutional 
changes as falling within the scope of “normal” and legitimate 
incremental interpretive moves, in order to accommodate and explain 
that which others are inclined to call informal amendments. However, 
for reasons of both process and substance, it is extremely difficult to 
persuasively argue that the reinterpretation of Article 9 by the Abe 
administration can be characterized as a legitimate interpretive 
development, regardless of how widely one casts the net. 
The first argument to be made is that the overwhelming majority 
of constitutional law scholars in Japan, applying the principles of 
constitutional interpretation most accepted within the Japanese legal 
system, have concluded and publicly avowed that the reinterpretation, 
and the national security legislation that reflects it, are invalid and 
unconstitutional.223 What is more, both the fact that there is such a 
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near consensus among legal scholars against a government policy, 
and the very public nature in which they have expressed their opinion, 
is more remarkable in Japan than it might be in the US.224 Thus, this 
position taken by the legal academy on the validity of the 
reinterpretation should by itself stand as fairly persuasive evidence 
that it cannot be characterized as a normal interpretive move within 
the Japanese constitutional system. 
The process and form of the change also militate against any 
attempt to characterize the change as a normal interpretive 
development. First, the agents of change are irregular. The executive, 
with the support of some extra-constitutional ad-hoc panel of experts, 
is not what we would typically consider to be the normal institution 
for advancing constitutional interpretation. This abnormality is 
exacerbated by the manner in which the executive has attempted to 
make an interpretive change here, with the Cabinet simply advancing 
a “new interpretation” that converts a fairly clear constitutional rule 
into a vague standard with ambiguous conditions precedent for the 
exercise of government power. Aside from the substantive problems 
with this, which I will return to below, there is simply no tradition or 
convention for limiting the frequency or range of such Cabinet 
“changes” to the interpretation of the Constitution, along the lines of 
the well-established conventions that constrain the interpretive 
developments of courts.225 This is all the more problematic when the 
executive reinterpretation is in the direction of relaxing constraints on 
government power. Once accepted as a valid form of change, 
presumably the Cabinet could revise its own interpretation at will 
whenever it was convenient to do so. 
Some would argue that in the US context the political branches 
of government enjoy greater competency than the judiciary to engage 
in the interpretation of some aspects of the constitution, such as war 
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powers and foreign policy.226 But even under this view, interpretive 
change is still seen as being far more the province of the judiciary, 
even if it is primarily in the role of endorsing and explaining the 
legitimacy of moves made by the other branches. As we saw in our 
discussion of informal amendment above, it is precisely when the 
political branches have pursued dramatic legislative or policy changes 
that are difficult to reconcile with the established understanding of the 
constitution, even if acquiesced in by the judiciary, that such changes 
tend to be viewed as something other than a normal interpretive 
development. It is too early to tell whether the Japanese judiciary will 
acquiesce or endorse this move, and it remains for me to presently 
explain how this change is difficult to reconcile with established 
understanding—but the fact that this change was deliberately 
orchestrated by the Cabinet is in any event irregular. 
Added to this is the unusual nature of the form of argument that 
was advanced in support of the reinterpretation. The very essence of 
the concept of legitimate interpretive development is that the 
proposed interpretation can be explained and justified as falling 
within a reasonable range of possible meanings for the provision in 
question, employing accepted principles of constitutional 
interpretation. The arguments advanced by the Cabinet, in its brief 
eight page Decision, made little attempt to conform to this idea and 
were not framed as constitutional analysis or interpretive argument. 
The basic form of the argument was largely result-oriented. It began 
with the claim that the increased threat levels in the region 
surrounding Japan required the country to have greater latitude to use 
force in collaboration with its allies to ensure its national security, 
from which it followed that Article 9 must be re-interpreted in a 
manner that permitted such use of force. In introducing the section on 
the controversial change regarding collective self-defense, the Cabinet 
Decision stated that: 
In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment 
surrounding Japan and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of 
its people under any situations, the Government has examined 
what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate, as 
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sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the 
constitutional interpretation to date were maintained.227 
This bald-faced process of working backward from a desired 
policy result to the formulation of a constitutional construction that 
would permit its realization, is simply not a legitimate approach to 
constitutional interpretation. The only constitutional argument 
attempted, after laying out the need for change to meet the demands 
of a new security situation, is a paragraph that tries to develop 
connections between the language of Article 9, that of the preamble of 
the Constitution, and Article 13. The preamble contains a clause 
which provides that the Japanese people recognize that “all peoples of 
the world have a right to live in peace”; and Article 13 provides that 
the right of all of the people “to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public 
welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other 
governmental affairs.”228 First of all, the Cabinet Decision actually 
misquotes the Preamble in a manner that suggests that the clause is 
articulating a right of the Japanese people to live in peace, when in 
fact it is referring to a right enjoyed by all the people of the world. In 
any event, it goes on to suggest that when considered within the 
context of these other provisions, the use of force to the “minimum 
extent necessary” permitted by Article 9, must be understood as 
allowing whatever is necessary for the “peace and security and to 
ensure [Japan’s] survival.”229 
Moreover, this is coupled with the fact that there was a frank 
acknowledgment, in both the Cabinet Decision and in the many 
presentations by Prime Minister Abe, that the reinterpretation 
comprised a significant change to the long established meaning of 
Article 9(1).230 While the Cabinet Decision did attempt to argue that 
there was some continuity with the underlying “basic logic” of the 
established interpretation,231 there was no suggestion that the 
reinterpretation was a mere incremental development in the evolution 
of the meaning of Article 9(1), but rather the Cabinet Decision 
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conceded that the reinterpretation was a marked change to permit 
policy that would have been otherwise unconstitutional. This, again, 
is not the typical form of incremental interpretive development. 
More important, of course, is the substantive analysis of the 
reinterpretation, and whether it can be viewed as being within a 
reasonable range of possible meanings of Article 9. The initial 
difficulty in analyzing the content of the reinterpretation for this 
purpose, however, is the degree of ambiguity and uncertainty that 
surrounds the precise contours of the reinterpretation itself. Thus far I 
have been focused on the Cabinet Decision, but what is less clear is 
the role the two Advisory Panel reports might play in any subsequent 
judicial interpretation of the reinterpretation. Depending on whether 
the Advisory Panel reports are to be considered as part of the 
reinterpretation, we have two distinct problems with its validity. On 
the one hand, if we look at the Advisory Panel reports as being part of 
the reinterpretation or informing how it is to be understood, then the 
reinterpretation could be said to render the renunciation in Article 
9(1) meaningless, which offends basic canons of constitutional 
interpretation.232 On the other hand, if we look at just the Cabinet 
Decision, then there is sufficient ambiguity and vagueness as to make 
the new interpretation of the provision non-justiciable. 
Beginning with the 2014 Advisory Panel report, it initially 
described how the established interpretation of Article 9 has 
consistently denied and prohibited any use of force beyond that for 
the exercise of individual self-defense. From there it went on to not 
only very explicitly recommend a reinterpretation that would allow 
for the exercise of collective self-defense, but also collective security 
operations authorized by the UN Security Council. Indeed, it 
recommended a construction that would permit any use of force that 
would be permitted by public international law. It did so on the 
fallacious argument that the clause “as means of settling international 
disputes” in Article 9(1) qualifies and limits the scope of the 
prohibition on the use of force, in that the exercise of neither 
individual nor collective self-defense constitutes “a use of force for 
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settling international disputes”. It goes even further, for good 
measure, by suggesting that the words “to which Japan is a party” 
should be simply read into the clause. As such any use of force for 
self-defense or UN collective security operations would be 
permissible, as it would then not be for the “settlement of 
international disputes to which Japan is a party.”233 
The background to this argument about the meaning of the 
phrase “settling international disputes” is not new, and indeed the 
Advisory Panel quotes testimony of a former Director General of the 
SDF to the Diet on the issue.234 The claim is often made by 
conservative proponents of expanding the meaning of Article 9 that 
this interpretation mirrors language and accepted meaning of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, but that is entirely inaccurate—not only is the 
language in the treaty actually quite different, but the relevant clause 
has never been accepted as having the meaning that Japanese 
conservatives attribute to it in any event.235 What is more, there is 
simply no foundation whatsoever for the idea that the jus ad bellum 
regime in international law makes a conceptual distinction between 
uses of force based on whether they are for “settlement of 
international disputes” as opposed to for any other purpose. It does 
not recognize self-defense as being somehow distinct from an 
international dispute, nor for that matter accept that a state is not “a 
party to a dispute” if it is acting in self-defense.236 What this argument 
in effect attempts to do, while studiously avoiding the language itself, 
is to reinterpret the clause “settling of international disputes” as 
meaning “engaging in acts of aggression”. This harkens back to older 
reactionary arguments that have been made within conservative 
circles in Japan, to the effect that Article 9 should be understood as 
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only prohibiting aggressive war—arguments that were rejected with 
the official interpretation of 1954, and consistently rejected ever 
since, for reasons that I turn to next.237 
Leaving aside all of these detailed objections to the basis for the 
Advisory Report argument, however, a more fundamental 
constitutional interpretation problem is posed by the implication of its 
argument. If, as the Advisory Panel report argued, Article 9 is to be 
now understood as permitting all uses of force that are permitted by 
the jus ad bellum regime in international law, or Article 9 only 
prohibits “aggressive war”, then we are left with Article 9(1) 
renouncing exactly nothing. It will be recalled that the provision 
states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes.” It is prohibiting certain uses of force that 
constitute sovereign rights under international law. While it is true 
that the English language version could be construed as identifying 
only “war” and not “the threat or use of force” as the sovereign rights 
that have been renounced, the Japanese language version makes it 
much more clear that it is both war and the threat or use of force that 
are being renounced as sovereign rights.238 But if Article 9 is 
construed as prohibiting only that which is already prohibited by 
international law, then it has renounced nothing, and the interpretation 
renders at least part of the text of the provision meaningless—which 
offends basic principles of constitutional interpretation. The meaning 
goes from a clear rule that renounces and prohibits the exercise of 
certain sovereign rights (that is, the right to collective self-defense or 
participation in UN authorized collective security operations), to a 
provision that renounces nothing, and merely confirms in ambiguous 
terms the country’s adherence to the jus ad bellum regime—which is 
entirely and categorically inconsistent with the original purpose of the 
provision, precedent, and the consistent understanding and operation 
of the provision for over sixty-five years. 
Such is the problem with the Advisory Panel’s report. If, on the 
other hand, we consider only the Cabinet Decision as articulating the 
substance of the reinterpretation, we are presented with a different 
                                                                                                             
237.  For my more extensive analysis and rejection of these arguments, see Martin, 
Binding the Dogs of War, supra note 109, at 312-13, 310 n.114. 
238.  Id. 
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problem. As discussed earlier in Part II, the Cabinet Decision does not 
go so far as to suggest that all uses of force permitted by international 
law are to be henceforth constitutional under the new understanding 
of Article 9(1), and indeed it even creates a sui generis conception of 
collective self-defense.239 But therein lies part of the problem—this 
conception of collective self-defense is vague, ambiguous, and non-
justiciable, if ever it came to be the basis for a constitutional 
challenge. Collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter 
permits states to use force against an aggressor state in response to an 
armed attack on any other member of the United Nations, upon a 
request for assistance from the victim and notification  of the UN 
Security Council that it is exercising the right.240 As explained earlier, 
the Cabinet resolution purports to limit the use of force in collective 
self-defense to responses to an armed attack on a state with which 
Japan has close relations, and where the armed attack is viewed as a 
threat to Japan’s survival or its people’s rights to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, and the use of force is necessary and 
proportionate.241 These additional conditions were provided as a sop 
to mollify the Komeitō, the ruling party’s coalition partner, as they 
create an impression that the bar for using force is higher, or the right 
of collective self-defense is narrower, than it is in international law.242 
But in reality the conditions and criteria are ill-defined and difficult to 
either interpret or enforce, and the government pronouncements have 
further exacerbated the problem. 
In discussing the operation and scope of the new right of 
collective self-defense, Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister 
Nakatani have both made comments about the possibility of Japan 
conducting mine-sweeping operations in the Straits of Hormuz if it 
were mined by Iran.243 If, as they have suggested, the authority relied 
upon for such action would be this right of collective self-defense as 
defined (rather than on other international law principles that might 
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authorize the clearing of mines from international straits),244 the 
comments reveal even greater uncertainty about the meaning of the 
new standard. They suggest that the armed attack on a country in 
close relations with Japan (however that relationship might be 
determined) may be uncoupled from the threat to Japan’s survival and 
the people’s rights to the pursuit of happiness, such that each is a 
separate trigger for exercising the right of collective self-defense. 
Abe’s comments on the issue have made no reference to how Iran’s 
mining the straits of Hormuz might even constitute an armed attack, 
but have instead focused on the threat posed to the livelihood of the 
Japanese people by such a blockade – a threat to the “people’s right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” in the language of the 
clause. This not only uncouples the exercise of collective self-defense 
from an armed attack on another country, but even from a threat to the 
survival of Japan, and potentially conditions it solely upon a threat to 
the livelihood of the people of Japan – however, that might be 
measured or defined.245 Finally, if the ambiguity of these conditions 
were not enough, representatives of the government have actually 
stated publicly that not all the conditions for the use of force have 
been or will be disclosed, thereby quite explicitly suggesting that 
there are additional secret criteria for the use of force.246 This 
ambiguity and uncertainty in the standard makes it arguably non-
justiciable. In the event that the national security legislation that 
implements this part of the reinterpretation, or some specific 
deployment authorized by it, is challenged in court as being a 
violation of Article 9, how is a court to interpret the provision in light 
of this ambiguous new understanding? The reinterpretation has the 
potential of rendering the provision, which was a relatively clear rule 
capable of enforcement, non-justiciable and thereby unenforceable. 
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The other problem posed by the reinterpretation as articulated by 
the Cabinet Decision, is that it is potentially inconsistent with the 
principles of jus ad bellum in international law. It has been argued 
that because the principles in Article 9(1) were drawn from 
international law, the interpretation of the provision should be 
informed by, and be consistent with the principles of jus ad bellum.247 
The Cabinet Decision’s articulation of collective self-defense is 
obviously a marked departure from any requirement to interpret the 
concepts in Article 9(1) in a manner consistent with the jus ad bellum, 
but the problem is far greater than that. The Cabinet Decision, and the 
resulting national security legislation, could authorize state action that 
would result in Japan being in actual violation of the principles of jus 
ad bellum. This is true with respect to the contemplated use of force 
in collective self-defense as indicated above—a use of force in 
response to conduct that does not constitute an armed attack on a third 
country, but is responding to a perceived threat to future survival of 
Japan, or even worse, merely to the Japanese people’s right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, would obviously not fall within 
the accepted exception for self-defense. This is more radical than the 
infamous Bush Doctrine of preventative self-defense, which has been 
roundly rejected in international law.248 
The reinterpretation does not, however, pose this problem only 
with respect to the use of force in collective self-defense. A careful 
review of the other two major elements of the Cabinet Decision 
reveals that it contemplates other possible uses of force that are also 
not at all consistent with international law. The most serious of these, 
is the stipulation that Japan could use force in response to “an 
infringement that does not amount to an armed attack,” in “situations 
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that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies”.249 The use of force 
in individual self-defense in international law is permitted under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, and customary international law, when 
either an armed attack has been carried out against the state exercising 
the right; or, under a more liberal interpretation that is widely 
accepted, when the launch of such an armed attack against the state is 
imminent.250 Depending on how the Cabinet Decision and 
implementing legislation is interpreted and acted upon, it could 
conceivably authorize Japanese military operations that would 
constitute a use of force in the absence of any armed attack, actual or 
imminent—circumstances that would not come close to satisfying the 
international law conditions for the lawful use of force under either 
Art. 51 or 42. The Advisory Panel actually sounded a note of sage 
caution in this regard in its 2014 Report, but was apparently 
ignored.251 
The second major part of the Cabinet Decision deals with the 
authorization for increased logistical and transportation support for 
the armed forces of allied forces engaged in armed conflict. The 
Cabinet Decision suggests that Japan’s increased support for the 
armed forces of belligerents is to be simply deemed as not integral to 
the use of force by such belligerent forces unless it is within actual 
theaters of combat,252 however that might be determined, and so will 
not constitute a use of force by Japan in violation of Art. 9.253 In a 
sense, this is not so much a reinterpretation of Art. 9 as it is an 
attempted reinterpretation of what constitutes support for and 
involvement in the actions of belligerents so as to attract state 
responsibility under international law. This is of course beyond the 
power and jurisdiction of the government of Japan—it cannot by 
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Cabinet resolution or domestic legislation simply “deem” its actions 
to be not complicit in the use of force by other nations as a matter of 
international law. And under international law, certain levels of 
support for or involvement in the operations of a belligerent state in a 
given armed conflict, will be sufficient to make the supporting state a 
belligerent to the conflict as well. It makes no distinction as to 
whether the support is directly to forces within theatres of combat or 
not, as the Cabinet Decision attempts to do. What is more, where the 
actions of the first belligerent constitute an act of aggression, 
responsibility for such aggression can be attributed to the supporting 
state.254 Neither the Cabinet Decision nor the implementing 
legislation includes any conditions that the belligerents that are 
benefiting from Japanese support are themselves complying with 
international law. Thus, such close logistical and transportation 
support could lead to Japanese operations being integrated with the 
unlawful use of force by other countries.255 
There is nothing, of course, that requires a constitutional 
provision in general to be consistent with international law. But as 
explained in Part II, Article 9(1) was drafted and ratified with the 
purpose of not only incorporating international law constraints into 
the Constitution, but also to add further limitations, renouncing rights 
that Japan would otherwise have under international law. That 
purpose and understanding was formalized by the CLB, obliquely 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1959, and complied with and 
acknowledged by every government for close to sixty years, until 
2014. The provision operated to effectively constrain policy in 
accordance with this understanding. The reinterpretation is a radical 
departure from that understanding, making permissible precisely that 
which had long been forbidden. Moreover, an interpretation that 
either renders the provision irrelevant or hopelessly ambiguous and 
vague, and which not only divorces its constituent concepts from their 
international law origins but would actually authorize state action that 
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would violate the jus ad bellum principles from which the language of 
Article 9(1) was drawn, simply cannot be accepted as a normal 
interpretive development. 
B. The Reinterpretation as Informal Amendment 
If the reinterpretation cannot be categorized as a normal and 
legitimate interpretive development, then the question is whether it 
can be classified as the kind of informal constitutional amendment 
discussed in Part I. Perhaps more importantly, if it is to be considered 
such an informal amendment, is it legitimate, and how would we 
know? And most central to our inquiry, what does that tell us about 
the nature of legitimacy, and the factors that determine legitimacy, 
within the context of informal amendment theory? 
On Levinson’s five-point scale, if the reinterpretation is not a 
formal amendment nor a normal interpretive development (leaving 
aside the category of “revision”), we are left with either informal 
amendment or revolutionary change. Informal amendment is the most 
likely option. And indeed there are aspects of the reinterpretation that 
map onto or share features of a number of the different theories of 
informal amendment. It could even be argued that it fits the five-stage 
model of Ackerman’s constitutional moment, which it will be recalled 
is comprised of: (i) contestation; (ii) challenge to dissenting 
institutions; (iii) public ratification; (iv) a switch in time; and (v) 
another public ratification. 256 Following Abe’s return to the office of 
the Prime Minister in 2012, there was public discussion and some 
debate regarding the possible amendment, and then reinterpretation, 
of Article 9 of the Constitution; there was a government challenge to 
one of the dissenting institutions, with the political appointment of an 
outsider as Director of the CLB; in December 2014, some six months 
after the Cabinet Decision was announced, the governing LDP and 
Komeitō coalition was broadly successful in the Lower House 
elections; the CLB might be said to have exhibited a “switch in time” 
by acquiescing to the validity of the reinterpretation, which was also 
implemented in a fashion through the new national security 
legislation passed in September, 2015; and then, finally, in July of 
2016 the governing LDP enjoyed considerable electoral success in the 
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Upper House elections, gaining a two-thirds majority for the first time 
in decades. 
Rosalind Dixon and Guy Baldwin have examined the extent to 
which the Japanese reinterpretation conforms to Ackerman’s theory 
of constitutional moments in a forthcoming article.257 They argue that 
despite the superficial conformity, the reinterpretation cannot be said 
to satisfy the criteria of Ackerman’s model, in part because there was 
not the kind of political competition and contestation required. They 
point out that a key component of Ackerman’s theory is that the 
public consider the proposed or contested change “with a seriousness 
that they do not normally accord to politics.”258 But while there was 
extraordinary public protest against the reinterpretation, and in 
particular the passing of the revised national security laws, all of 
which would appear to reflect some level of public engagement, there 
was not the kind of informed debate that would produce open and 
searching deliberation, and thus no genuine public ratification and 
political consensus.  
To start, the government itself attempted to stifle the public 
debate, leading to widespread criticism of the increasing erosion of 
press freedoms in Japan.259 This undermined the prospect for open 
and searching deliberation. Notwithstanding this, the public 
opposition to the reinterpretation has persisted, and public opinion 
polls have continued to show a majority of the Japanese people 
opposed to both the reinterpretation and the revised national security 
legislation, right on down to the present day,260 and the majority of 
the opposition parties also remained opposed to the entire 
reinterpretation effort throughout.261 But that too does not evidence 
true contestation, and it certainly cuts against the idea of ratification. 
This is because the LDP could, and did, entirely ignore the opposition 
and protest without fear of punishment at the polls. The reason that 
such public and political opposition did not translate into electoral 
losses for the LDP was simply because of the fragmented and 
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impotent nature of political opposition in Japan generally. The LDP 
has dominated the political process in Japan since 1955, with only 
three short breaks. After the perceived failures of the Japanese 
Democratic Party (“DPJ”) during its short reign between 2009-12, 
there developed a prevailing view that there was no real alternative to 
the LDP, even though there was little support for Abe’s policies.262 
One result of this, Dixon and Baldwin argue, is that the process 
surrounding the reinterpretation has not been characterized by the 
kind of political and public contestation that is required by 
Ackerman’s theory of democratic constitutional change.263 
Another consequence of this analysis, however, is that it would 
be very difficult to really classify either the 2014 Lower House 
election results or the even more successful 2016 Upper House 
elections, as being a public ratification of the reinterpretation policy. 
As was noted in Part I, critics such as John Dow have argued that 
even in the US context, it is extremely difficult to attribute meaning to 
election results, and that therefore Ackerman’s distinction between 
normal politics and constitutional politics, and his interpretation of 
election results as expressions of popular sovereignty in the process of 
higher law-making, is entirely misguided.264 This criticism is all the 
more powerful when applied to the Japanese political system, where 
one party has dominated for six decades, and the election success of 
individual candidates and parties as a whole are said to be little 
influenced by policy platforms or positions.265 The clear and 
consistent opposition to the reinterpretation effort though and after the 
elections, coupled with the conspicuous policy of the LDP not to refer 
to constitutional issues during the 2016 campaign, deprives the 
elections of any value as an expression of popular will in support of 
the constitutional change. I will return to this point below when we 
return to the question of legitimacy, but here it is relevant to the 
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question of whether the Japanese reinterpretation fits Ackerman’s 
model—and it arguably does not. 
It might be objected at this point that not only Ackerman’s 
model, but the informal amendment theory I have explored more 
generally is simply too dependent upon the particular proclivities of 
the US constitutional system to be susceptible to application to a 
system such as Japan’s. Where one party has been in power for more 
than sixty of the last seventy years, and Supreme Court justices rarely 
serve for more than two or three years,266 the theory of constitutional 
revolution through partisan entrenchment, for instance, can have little 
relevance. Indeed, where a Supreme Court is so weak that legislation 
or government action has only ever been determined unconstitutional 
ten times in sixty-nine years, there is actually little tradition of normal 
interpretive development as a process of constitutional change, far 
less informal amendment.267 These are all valid objections up to a 
point, but they do not, in my view, disqualify the effort of applying 
informal amendment theory to the Japanese situation, or make the 
Japanese case study irrelevant to our understanding of informal 
amendment. Indeed, Carlos Bernal has focused on the particular role 
that weak courts may play in the form of informal amendment that he 
terms “infra-constitutional mutation”.268 The mechanisms and 
modalities of informal amendment may differ from system to system, 
but the underlying concept, and the problems that it raises, remain 
relevant. As indicated earlier, there are European analogues to 
theories of informal amendment, and there is similarly a theoretical 
debate over a form of informal amendment in Japanese constitutional 
law as well.269 
One of the primary problems that is common to all of these 
debates (even if not the explicit focus of them), is the question of 
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legitimacy. At the end of the day Ackerman’s model is not a theory 
for identifying all informal amendments, it is a theory for explaining 
why informal amendments that share certain characteristics deserve to 
be accepted as being legitimate. That is precisely why there is such an 
emphasis on political contestation and expressions of popular 
sovereignty in his theory—not as essential elements for determining 
whether a constitutional change that exceeds normal interpretive 
development is an informal amendment, but as necessary conditions 
for such changes to be blessed with the status of legitimacy. The fact 
that Ackerman’s model does not fit the Japanese developments does 
not negate the reinterpretation’s status as an informal amendment, but 
it does mean that Ackerman’s model cannot be a source of support for 
claims that the Japanese reinterpretation is a legitimate constitutional 
change. 
C. Clarifying the Contours of Legitimacy 
This brings us directly to the question of how we are to assess 
the legitimacy of the reinterpretation, and from there, how we should 
think about the legitimacy of informal amendments more generally. 
As indicated at the outset, this may depend in part on contingencies 
that have yet to unfold, such as how the Supreme Court deals with 
challenges to the reinterpretation. But let us assume that the courts 
either dismiss any claims on doctrines such as standing, or even, 
under a worst/best case scenario, meekly endorses the 
constitutionality of the national security legislation. That would not be 
dispositive of the legitimacy of the change. There are other factors or 
criteria to be considered in assessing its legitimacy. 
To begin with, I would suggest that the absence of any 
expression of popular will in favor of the change, is a factor that 
counts against its legitimacy. It is here that the Japanese case forces 
us to look at Ackerman’s model from a slightly different perspective, 
and in so doing reveals some potentially under-appreciated value in 
his theory. As mentioned earlier, the point from Ackerman’s theory to 
be emphasized here, is not that public ratification is a criteria for 
defining informal amendment, or that it is a sufficient condition for 
the legitimacy of such an informal amendment—but rather, that such 
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ratification should be a necessary condition for the legitimacy of any 
putative informal amendment.270  
This insight tends to be missed in the criticisms of the theory. 
Dow and others have criticized Ackerman’s theory on the grounds 
that, contrary to his assertions, it is impossible to meaningfully infer 
any expression of popular sovereignty from the elections surrounding 
the Reconstruction Amendments or the New Deal policy 
developments.271 But this is first an empirical or factual critique, from 
which they then develop a more general normative argument, namely 
that one can never attribute sufficiently precise meaning to elections 
so as to enable us to learn whether the popular will relates at all to any 
given constitutional change. As Dow puts it, “the basic problem with 
postulating a theory whereby the political climate yields constitutional 
text is that reading electoral politics is only slightly less fatuous than 
reading tea leaves.”272 But none of this means that Ackerman is 
wrong in his basic intuition—that absent an expression of popular will 
in favor of the putative informal amendment, such a constitutional 
change cannot be legitimate. Amar’s theory shares the same intuition, 
and goes somewhat further by arguing that informal amendment can 
only be legitimate if it is initiated by “we the people”.273 We may be 
inclined to agree with the critics that it is impossible to know whether 
any given election actually represents some kind of ratification, and 
thus it is not sufficient to endow a constitutional change with 
legitimacy—but we could still agree with Ackerman that absent some 
expression of public consent the constitutional change surely cannot 
be legitimate. In short, what remains sound from Ackerman, even 
after the critics are done, is the idea that a clear expression of popular 
will in favor of the constitutional change may not be sufficient, but it 
is surely necessary. And if this is so, the Japanese reinterpretation 
must surely be judged to be illegitimate, at least for now. In this 
sense, then, the Japanese experiment may reveal that Ackerman’s 
theory retains some considerable value. 
                                                                                                             
270.  Tom Ginsburg made a related point in a short essay during the reinterpretation 
debate. See Tom Ginsburg, Rearmament and the Rule of Law in Japan: When is it OK to 
Change the Constitution with a Statute?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-ginsburg/rearmament-and-the-rule-o_b_7845402.html. 
271.  See Dow, supra note 1, at 129-31. 
272.  Id. at 129. 
273.  Amar, supra note 1, at 89. Unlike Ackerman, however, Amar denies that the 
government can engage in constitutional amendment outside of the Art. V process. 
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The second factor of legitimacy that the Japanese developments 
bring into stark focus, is that of the deliberate intent on the part of 
those trying to effect a constitutional amendment—what I have called 
the “deliberate agency” factor. The reinterpretation effort examined 
above reflects a degree of deliberation, calculation, and self-
consciousness that is hard to find in any other example invoked in 
informal amendment theory. Consider: a public avowal that the 
proposed change to a core constitutional provision is dramatic and 
unprecedented; the employment of a process of executive 
reinterpretation that was a calculated circumvention of the formal 
amendment procedure to effect the change, after first attempting and 
failing to change the amendment procedure itself; political 
interference in the institutions that might block the change; engaging 
international law commitments to lock in the change before any 
legislative involvement or public debate; unprecedented pressure and 
interference in the media to attenuate media criticism; oblique 
implementation of the change through revisions to existing 
legislation; and, finally, the flagrant disregard for popular and 
political opposition—it is an extraordinary illustration of pre-
meditated executive action to effect informal constitutional 
amendment, for the very purpose of relaxing the constitutional 
constraints on executive action. 
Now, there will be some who would suggest that Roosevelt’s 
actions were no less pre-meditated and calculating, and that he was 
perhaps more disingenuous about the extent to which he understood 
that he was trying to alter the constitutional system.274 But we need 
not settle that question here. Regardless of what we decide the 
historical record may reveal about Roosevelt’s state of mind and 
intentions, the fact is that time has operated to legitimize the changes 
in any event—the third factor to which I will turn presently. But the 
Japanese case brings the issue of deliberate agency into such stark 
relief, virtually demanding that we ask and answer the question: can 
                                                                                                             
274.  Ackerman’s theory acknowledges, or even depends upon, a consciousness of 
circumvention, but he does not provide the evidence that Roosevelt was deliberately 
circumventing the amendment procedure. See Choudhry, supra note 47, at 197-208 (arguing 
that Ackerman fails to support the idea of conscious or deliberate circumvention with 
historical evidence). See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 1. But then Dow is also severely 
critical about how both Ackerman and Amar engage in a selective and result-oriented use of 
history to make their arguments. See Dow, supra note 1, at 135. 
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an informal amendment so deliberately implemented by a political 
branch of government, particularly the executive, as a calculated 
circumvention of the formal amendment procedure, ever be legitimate 
at the time it was undertaken? 
I would suggest that as a theoretical matter such pre-meditated 
action to bring about an informal amendment lacks legitimacy ipso 
facto. It is one thing to suggest that there may be some reason to 
confer some degree of legitimacy upon constitutional changes, even 
constitutional “revolutions”, which result from the dynamic 
interaction of complex legal, political, and administrative forces, a 
process that is inherently unpredictable and not susceptible to control 
by any one branch or actor within the system. Even the process of 
constitutional revolution through partisan entrenchment described by 
Balkin and Levinson lacks the kind of controlled and pre-meditated 
manipulation of specific constitutional provisions that is exhibited in 
the Japanese case. It is true that in such revolutions the dominant 
party, which is trying to entrench its constitutional ideology in the 
judiciary through the appointments process, is acting in a self-
conscious and pre-mediated fashion. But Balkin and Levinson note 
that overall the process of change that results is organic and 
unpredictable, “in precisely the same way as coalitions in 
multimember legislatures are unpredictable”.275 In contrast, for an 
executive to single-mindedly circumvent the formal amendment 
procedure in order to change a core provision, one that was 
specifically designed as a pre-commitment device to constrain the 
executive, seems to make a mockery of the basic principles of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law.276 It undermines the normative 
power of the entire constitutional system. It represents, in the most 
concentrated form, all the problems against which the critics of 
informal amendment theory rail. To say that this form of change too 
could be legitimate at the time that it is undertaken, without some 
other grounds for according it such legitimacy (such as, for argument 
sake, a clear and explicit mandate from the people), is simply not to 
take the constitution and constitutionalism seriously. As Dow argues, 
                                                                                                             
275.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1068-69, 1082. 
276.  Richard Albert makes a similar argument regarding the illegitimacy of deliberate 
attempts to establish constitutional conventions, as a means of circumventing difficult 
amendment procedures. See Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Stealth, supra note 46, at 
678, 713. 
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one has to distinguish between the power to effect change from the 
authority to effect change—and by implication, where there was no 
authority, there can be no legitimacy for such change.277 
Now, it should be conceded that this argument could lead to 
perverse incentives for governments to engage in greater duplicity 
and subterfuge. Rather than being transparent and open as Abe has 
been in his intentions and his acknowledgement of the nature of the 
change, the government could have maintained that the planned 
change was nothing more than an incremental evolution in meaning, 
entirely consistent with the purpose, text, and history of the provision. 
Indeed, one can envision a scenario in which the government avoided 
any formal announcement of change along the lines of the Cabinet 
Decision, but simply tried to implement changes through revisions to 
national security legislation, with assertions that the revisions were 
consistent with an evolving understanding of Article 9. The 
constitutional system is surely not better served by that kind of 
duplicitous government conduct, and yet condemning deliberate and 
open efforts at informal change as prima facie illegitimate, would 
actually incentivize such conduct and thereby undermine the integrity 
of the system—or so the argument would go. 278 
My response is that such duplicitous efforts would indeed be just 
as illegitimate, and would add insult to injury through the additional 
harm caused by the deceit. But it is beside the point. We ought not to 
turn our face from calling out the evil of illegitimate government 
action because we think it may make the government add deceit to its 
sins. The real comparison I want to draw is between the deliberate 
and calculated circumvention of the formal amendment procedure on 
the one hand, and on the other hand the more organic and dynamic 
change that results from the complex interaction of forces among the 
different political branches of government, the bureaucracy, civil 
society, and the judiciary. This latter form of change, which is more 
in line with the kind of dialectic process described by Balkin,279 and 
the administrative constitutionalism described by Strauss,280 for 
instance, is not deliberate in the sense that there is no one entity that 
                                                                                                             
277.  See Dow, supra note 1, at 122. 
278.  My thanks to Rosalind Dixon for raising this issue in the presentation of the 
project at the University of New South Wales conference, Aug. 12, 2016. 
279.  See supra Section I.B. 
280.  Id. 
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planned for and orchestrated the change, and set out to circumvent the 
amendment procedure in a pre-meditated and calculated fashion. In 
this sense, in my view, such changes that occur organically are more 
defensible, and have a better claim to some legitimacy, than the 
deliberate and calculated change illustrated by the Japanese 
reinterpretation. If the government were more duplicitous and covert 
in its efforts, it would be harder to determine that it was deliberate and 
calculated to be sure, and such duplicity would merit even more 
severe criticism and opprobrium. But I do not think that this detracts 
from the argument that deliberate efforts at significant constitutional 
change are prima facie illegitimate. 
Returning to the relationship between the deliberate nature of the 
change and ratification by the public, Dow and others argue that even 
if the majority of the people were to approve such an informal 
amendment it would still be illegitimate. As discussed earlier Dow 
and other critics argue that Ackerman and Amar, and other 
proponents of the idea that expressions of the popular will can 
legitimate informal amendment, are confusing majoritarianism and 
popular sovereignty. They point out that the formal amendment 
procedures provided for in constitutions like those of the US and 
Japan, in requiring super-majorities of one kind or another, reflect the 
idea that in the interest of protecting minority rights and entrenching 
values, constraints, and pre-commitment devices, compromises to 
majoritarian principles must be accepted—and these compromises 
were themselves actually accepted in a ratification process that 
represented an expression of popular sovereignty.281 
I find these arguments to be quite persuasive and well founded. 
Yet I do not propose to resolve that debate here, but want to stake out 
a more modest claim, and suggest that it is a claim that should be able 
to command broader support than some of the critics’ arguments, and 
also add some clarity to our thinking about the contours of legitimacy. 
The claim is that it might be conceivable for a very explicit and 
unequivocal expression of popular support for an informal 
amendment, even one effected by a deliberate and pre-meditated 
government effort, to confer some legitimacy upon the change—with 
the proviso that changes to fundamental rights would be exempted 
                                                                                                             
281.  Dow, supra note 1, at 123-24. 
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from this exception.282 Suppose, for instance, that given the lack of a 
two-thirds majority in both chambers of the Diet, the Abe government 
had undertaken the changes we have described, but then conducted a 
referendum on the very issue of the validity of the changes. It would 
not have been in conformity with the Article 96 amending procedure, 
but if a majority of the votes cast in the referendum on a clear 
question were in favor of recognizing the change, the government 
would arguably have a much stronger claim to legitimacy. Note that 
this argument relies on a clear referendum on the issue, not a mere 
election along the lines posited in Ackerman’s retrospective analysis 
of past American changes. It might be argued that if there were such 
expressions of popular support, after the kind of open public political 
deliberation and contest that Ackerman’s theory contemplates, then in 
such a case, but only in such case, a deliberate effort at informal 
amendment might have some claim to legitimacy, once having been 
so endorsed. 
One further proviso to this argument is that to have any claim to 
legitimacy, the informal constitutional change so endorsed by the 
popular will must also be the kind of change that would have been 
legitimate if brought about through the formal amendment process. 
Thus far we have been proceeding on the assumption that any formal 
amendment is ipso facto legitimate, but this is not necessarily true. 
There are a number of theories, primarily in European constitutional 
law systems, that suggest that attempts to amend certain fundamental 
or core features of a constitution are illegitimate. Richard Albert, in a 
forthcoming article, elaborates on such theories to argue that formal 
amendments that are “self-conscious efforts to repudiate the essential 
characteristics of the constitution” and which are inconsistent with the 
constitution’s fundamental purpose and original framework, 
constitute a constitutional dismemberment.283 There is a thread in 
                                                                                                             
282.  My exception, if it were to allow for the informal amendment to fundamental 
rights on the basis of mere majority vote in a referendum, would of course conjure up all the 
issues surrounding Proposition 8 in California; and the arguments of Dow and others that 
allowing for such informal amendment would eviscerate a constitution’s protections for 
minority rights would be exactly right. 
283.  Richard Albert, Constitutional Dismemberment (Nov. 25, 2016) (unpublished 
article, Boston College Law School Research Paper 424), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2875931); see also, YANIV ROZNAI, 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (forthcoming, 2017) (manuscript on 
file with author). 
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Japanese constitutional discourse, relying on German constitutional 
theory, that suggests that any amendments to Article 9 that 
undermined the fundamental constitutional commitment to pacifism 
would be impermissible and illegitimate,284 and Albert picks up on 
this in arguing that the current LDP efforts to amend Article 9 would 
constitute a constitutional dismemberment.285 In light of the analysis 
of the substance of the reinterpretation above, and the argument that it 
is fundamentally inconsistent with the established and accepted 
understanding and purpose of Article 9, these theories would provide 
one more ground for suggesting that the reinterpretation is 
illegitimate. But for now, without delving into that analysis, I simply 
flag this further proviso that for an informal constitutional change to 
be legitimate, the change would have to have been legitimate if 
effected through the formal amendment process. 
Such is the relationship between deliberate agency and popular 
will. The last factor to be considered is that of time. The most obvious 
characteristic of time, as it relates to legitimacy, is that even those 
constitutional changes that were hotly contested as being entirely 
unauthorized at the time they were made, will gradually become 
accepted over time—so long as the change is sustained and it 
becomes entrenched. After the passage of sufficient time, they will at 
some point enjoy a full measure legitimacy. While we may still 
debate the extent to which some of the New Deal innovations were 
authorized and legitimate constitutional moves, they have become 
part of the constitutional system and so must be treated as legitimate 
in practice. The reason for this is obvious, being that over time the 
constitutional change becomes the foundation for new law, policy, 
and jurisprudence. As it goes from being an innovative constitutional 
construction to being the foundation for subsequent interpretation, as 
well as the basis for other law and policy,  the prospect of trying to 
overturn it becomes increasingly costly and practically infeasible, to 
the point where it becomes accepted, and eventually recognized as 
legitimate. From this we might distil a general principle that informal 
amendments will become legitimate with the passage of time. But the 
significance of the concept does not end there—there is more to be 
said about the concept of time as a factor of legitimacy. 
                                                                                                             
284.   See, e.g., ASHIBE, supra note 48, at 365-68 
285.  Albert, Constitutional Dismemberment, supra note 283, at 11-16. 
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Consider the fact that most formal amendments are immediately 
legitimate. They require no passage of time whatsoever to exercise a 
full claim to legitimacy—precisely because they are promulgated in 
accordance with the procedures authorized and mandated by the 
constitution.286 Similarly, interpretive developments that are largely 
uncontroversial, which are accepted by all as falling within the range 
of possible meanings for the provision in question, likewise command 
almost immediate legitimacy. Where the authority for a constitutional 
change is apparent and agreed, time is irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
the change. Constitutional authority is equivalent to immediate and 
corresponding legitimacy. As we move along the spectrum away from 
full authority, however, towards more contested interpretive 
developments, time will begin to play a role. Authority and legitimacy 
may be contested at the outset, and the level of legitimacy will be as 
low as the perceived level of constitutional authority at the time of the 
change—but if the change is sustained and entrenched, over time it 
will have an increasingly strong claim to de facto validity and thus 
legitimacy. This is all the more true for informal amendments, where 
the legitimacy of the change is even more contested and questionable 
at the outset, but may gradually increase over time if the change 
remains entrenched. The (limited or even non-existent) formal 
authority for the change does not change, but acceptance, de facto 
validity, and hence legitimacy, will begin to increase over time. This 
may be so even when the apparent legitimacy is a result more of 
begrudging acquiescence than genuine acceptance or approval.287 In 
this way we might say that time is what separates legitimacy from 
authority. Legitimacy originally flows from, and is coextensive with, 
                                                                                                             
286.  Noting, of course, the exceptions referred to earlier, supra note 283. Authors such 
as Strauss might argue that this proposition needs to be further qualified somewhat, and that 
some amendments, such as the 18th Amendment, were not immediately legitimate. But my 
argument is that all formal amendments have at least an immediate claim to legitimacy by 
reason that they were promulgated in accordance with formal constitutional authority. See 
Strauss, supra note 1. 
287.   One analogy for this might be a building that is constructed in violation of zoning 
or architectural regulations. Over time, as other structures are built alongside and on top of it, 
structurally reliant upon it, the cost and difficulty of demolishing or otherwise brining it into 
compliance becomes too high, and it comes to be accepted, and subsequent development upon 
it is seen as legitimate, even as the absence for initial authority to build it remains apparent. 
Thanks to Mahesh Daas for the analogy, and Richard Albert for similar arguments on 
acquiescence versus acceptance. See also supra note 54 and Part I more generally. 
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the constitutional authority, but over time the two concepts begin to 
diverge. 
If we were to try to conceptualize this graphically, it begins to 
look quite different from the model evoked by the traditional 
discussion of informal amendments described in Part I. In those 
accounts, informal amendments tend to be characterized as being 
somewhere in the middle of a simple spectrum, bordered by 
legitimate interpretive developments at one end, and formal 
amendments at the other—with the form of change developing from 
the incremental at one end, through more radical informal change in 
the middle, to full formal amendment at the other end. While none of 
the accounts develop or explain this spectrum in detail, the inference 
is that movement along the spectrum reflects the magnitude of the 
changes at any given point, but this tends to be confusing—for while 
magnitude increases uniformly from interpretive change through to 
formal amendment, authority is weakest in the middle, for informal 
amendment. 
In the re-conceptualization explored here, however, the focus is 
explicitly on legitimacy and authority—with the additional dimension 
of time—and this tends to re-order the types of change, and clarifies 
the relationships. Thus, we might conceptualize it with authority 
forming the X-axis and legitimacy forming the Y-axis, in which 
constitutional change would form a linear plot from left to right—the 
higher the authority for a constitutional change the higher the 
legitimacy, and the lower the authority the lower the legitimacy. 
Formal amendment would be at the far right of the axis, and the most 
flagrant and questionable efforts at constitutional change at the origin, 
with zero authority and zero legitimacy. As changes move left along 
the X-axis from the high of formal amendment, meaning that the 
constitutional authority for such changes is declining, their legitimacy 
on the Y-axis correspondingly declines. 
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Fig. 1. – Legitimacy and Authority of Constitutional Change. 
Time, however, adds a third dimension to this model. Imagine 
that there is a Z-axis that represents the passage of time. Then we 
would get a three dimensional figure (which is much more difficult to 
visualize or to graph—the figures here are merely two-dimensional 
slices of the three-dimensional model), in which changes that had a 
low level of both authority and legitimacy at the moment of change, 
say T1, would experience an increase in legitimacy as the increment 
of time increases, from its low starting point at T1 when legitimacy 
and authority exactly corresponded, to a point at T5, when legitimacy 
has increased to some robust number, while authority has remained 
constant (low or zero) over time. 
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Fig. 2. – Legitimacy and Authority - Divergence Over Time 
This new conceptualization of the relationship among 
legitimacy, authority, and time, helps to illustrate a couple of 
significant features of the kind of deliberate informal change we have 
been discussing. The first is that it illustrates the intuition that the 
more unauthorized and illegitimate a constitutional change is at the 
outset, the longer the passage of time that will be required for it to 
achieve a level of legitimacy for de facto acceptance. This intuition 
can be explained by the hypothesis that the more contested a 
constitutional change may be, the more heated the opposition and thus 
the more resistance there will be to allowing new laws, policies, or 
judicial decisions that would depend upon the change as a foundation. 
There will, therefore, be some measure of uncertainty and instability 
surrounding the change, which will create a drag on the process of it 
being legitimated. This in turn will create a longer period of time 
during which opponents may try to overturn the change before it 
becomes entrenched. Thus, when applied to the arguments above, 
                                                                                                             
 This depicts only the Y and Z axes, and thus a different two-dimensional slice of the 
three dimensional graph that would include the X and Y axes depicted in Figure 1. The units of 
time here could be decades, though of course the increase in legitimacy would not be linear, 
uniform, or at the same rate over time for different constitutional changes—both figures are 
highly simplified renditions merely designed to help visualize the relationships. 
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about the prima facie illegitimacy of the deliberate informal 
amendment efforts of the Abe government, we may predict that the 
reinterpretation will become legitimate over time, but it is starting at a 
lower point and thus should take more time to attain a robust level of 
legitimacy and acceptance than some contested interpretive 
development arising from a judicial decision. 
This re-conceptualization also helps to graphically highlight 
another perspective from which to view the illegitimacy of the claim 
that deliberate and calculated informal amendment efforts are 
effectively trying to make. The architects of the deliberate informal 
amendment are in effect attempting to obtain the immediate 
legitimacy accorded to formal amendments, while circumventing the 
formal amendment procedure itself. It is an attempt to obtain 
immediate legitimacy for a change with neither the constitutional 
authority that would confer such legitimacy, nor the passage of time 
that might confer such legitimacy in the absence of authority.288 It 
provides yet another argument for the proposition that deliberate 
efforts at informal amendment lack the necessary prerequisites for 
any valid claim to legitimacy, at least at the time they are undertaken. 
One last related point needs to be made about how we should 
think about the legitimacy of informal amendments. It relates to 
questions about the precedential value of past informal amendments 
that have gained legitimacy over time. For instance, let us suppose 
that we accept that some of the constitutional changes in American 
constitutional history were indeed informal amendments, as 
Ackerman and others have classified them, but we reject that they 
were legitimate at the time they were made—either because we do not 
accept that there was any explicit popular ratification of the change, 
or because we reject other aspects of the process by which they were 
made—but we do recognize and accept that the changes have become 
legitimate over time. Could that past change ever be invoked by a 
government as a precedent that justifies its current efforts to 
implement a constitutional change through a similar process, and in 
circumvention of the formal amendment procedure? In other words, 
could such justification grounded in precedent weaken or qualify the 
argument made earlier, that deliberate and intentional efforts to 
engage in informal amendment are prima facie illegitimate? I think 
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not. Even if we are forced to concede that informal amendments may 
occur, and that such past changes may have become legitimate over 
time even though they lacked authority and legitimacy at the time 
they were made, that provides no justification or authority for 
governments who seek to implement such changes in the present. In 
sum, explicit ratification may possibly cure the illegitimacy of 
deliberate agency, and time will likely legitimate unauthorized 
changes, but governments cannot reach back in time for precedents to 
justify their deliberate efforts to implement informal amendments. In 
concrete terms, Prime Minister Abe cannot invoke Roosevelt’s New 
Deal programs (to the extent we think some of those constituted 
informal amendments) as a justification for the reinterpretation of 
Article 9. 
So we are left with the conclusion that a deliberate informal 
amendment is prima facie illegitimate, unless, possibly, it is ratified 
by a very explicit and genuine expression of popular consent; but that 
they will nonetheless be legitimated by the passage of time if they are 
not quickly repudiated. It is perhaps a rather depressing conclusion. 
But it brings us back to Balkin and Levinson’s argument for the 
opposition of high politics. In their discussion of constitutional 
revolution through partisan entrenchment, Balkin and Levinson argue 
that the best response to such revolutionary change is to criticize the 
institutions of change in terms of what they call “high politics”. By 
high politics they mean the competing visions of the constitution, its 
fundamental values and principles, differing narratives of the nation’s 
political and constitutional history, and contested conceptions of who 
“we the people” are as a nation.289 Moreover, the protest and 
opposition to the revolutionary change must be made not narrowly at 
the institution most directly responsible for the change (the Supreme 
Court in their US-based argument), but more broadly to the political 
parties, civil society, and the public at large. It is a battle for the hearts 
and minds of the nation as a whole. Applying this to the Japanese 
context, there may be some time in which to engage in such a battle 
of high politics, before the passage of time entrenches and legitimizes 
the purported constitutional change to Article 9—but the clock is 
running. Time is of the essence. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has suggested that more work needs to be done to 
clarify the contours of legitimacy in our thinking about informal 
constitutional amendment. The discussion has focused on three 
different concepts that I have suggested are factors in determining the 
legitimacy of an informal amendment, namely: the extent to which 
there is deliberate agency in orchestrating the change; the extent to 
which there has been a genuinely contested and explicit popular 
ratification of the change; and the passage of time. In considering the 
element of time, this examination has suggested that time is one factor 
that separates the concept of constitutional authority and that of 
legitimacy, as time will tend to legitimize a change even as the 
constitutional authority for the change remains constant. This 
distinction helps us to re-conceptualize the relationship among 
authority, legitimacy and time in thinking about constitutional change, 
and provides some support for the hypothesis that even the most 
unauthorized constitutional change may become legitimate over time 
if it can be sustained. 
Using an examination of the Japanese reinterpretation as case 
study that brings these issues into stark relief, I have argued that 
informal amendments that are undertaken with deliberate intent to 
effect what amounts to a constitutional amendment, in a manner 
calculated to circumvent the formal amendment procedure, are prima 
facie illegitimate at the time. This is in contrast to the kinds of 
informal amendments that can arise as unorchestrated and typically 
unpredictable consequences of the operation of interrelated and 
complex political, policy, legal and popular forces. I have argued that 
such deliberate informal amendment might possibly be cured by a 
genuine and very explicit expression of popular will, such as a special 
referendum on a clear question about the amendment, and only in the 
context of genuine political contestation and open public deliberation. 
In this regard, the study reveals a possibly overlooked insight in 
Ackerman’s theory. While his critics are right that public ratification 
is difficult to infer from normal elections, and that public ratification 
may not alone be sufficient for legitimacy, it is surely a necessary 
condition for the legitimacy of informal amendments at the time they 
occur, particularly where they are undertaken with deliberate agency. 
Finally, I have suggested that because deliberate informal 
amendments suffer from so little constitutional authority and 
legitimacy at the time they occur, that both descriptively and 
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normatively they should take a longer time than other contested 
changes to be legitimized by the passage of time. 
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